




Explaining the Cooperative Nature of 
Norwegian-Russian Petroleum Relations in 
















Department of Comparative Politics 








In this thesis, I consider the following research question: Why have Norwegian-Russian 
petroleum relations in the High North remained cooperative? 
 
Petroleum cooperation between these two states in the High North has not always been 
straight-forward and predictable. However, cooperation within this area and in this region has 
been more stable and successful than general foreign- and security policy cooperation 
between Norway and Russia. Furthermore, cooperation between Norway and Russia has been 
more successful than cooperation between Russia and the West more generally. It is this 
paradox that provides the main puzzle for my thesis. 
 
In this game theoretical analysis, I seek answers to my research question by employing two 
separate hypotheses. These hypotheses are then tested via the Varangerfjord Agreement of 
1957, the Grey Zone Agreement of 1978 and the Delimitation Agreement of 2010. These 
agreements have been chosen because they are three of the most documented examples of 
negotiations taking place between Norway and Russia in the High North. They also represent 
the resolution of a delimitation dispute over time. Furthermore, the signing of the 
Delimitation Agreement of 2010 came as a surprise to many, and it is therefore worthwhile to 
scrutinize why this dispute was solved at this particular time and which factors helped 
facilitate this successful outcome.  
 
Any negotiation may have an outcome ranging from total disagreement, on the one hand, to 
complete agreement, on the other hand, and different degrees of ambiguity in between. 
Further, there are several side-effects of the process leading to the settlement that has nothing 
to do with the agreement between the two states, but rather deal with third parties, 
international publicity, and so on (Iklé 1964: 59). Had I attempted to combine all these 
heterogeneous factors, the negotiating process would have seamlessly intertwined with the 
field of international relations. However, such an approach is not possible. It is therefore 
essential to focus only on the question of why the particular negotiation process lead to the 
agreement under investigation. Following this method, I find that a combination of mutual 
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1 Introduction  
 
This chapter will introduce the reasons why it is worthwhile investigating the cooperative 
petroleum relationship between Norway and Russia in the High North, and the research 
question at hand. This chapter will then explain the research design of the thesis, including 
which data, method and hypotheses have been evaluated. The final part of this chapter will 
highlight the contribution this thesis makes to the existing literature on the topic, and outline 
how the rest of the thesis will be structured.  
 
The Norwegian government has put the High North at the top of its foreign policy priorities 
since 2005 (Jensen and Rottem 2010: 75; Jespersen and Vestergaard 2015: 37; Keil 2014: 
174; The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006) and will continue to do so in years to 
come (Orheim 2006: 29; The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011). In its Arctic 
Strategy paper, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NMFA) outlines that it will 
“work to increase the positive local and regional spin-off effects of oil and gas activities” and 
continue to grant oil and gas “licenses on an annual basis in predefined areas” (2017: 24). 
This part of the Norwegian High North strategy seeks to expand and improve Norway’s 
position in the international oil and gas market. Norway considers the resources in the Barents 
Sea to be decisive in this regard, as the resources here are strategically well-positioned 
relative to supply the rest of Europe. The Norwegian government therefore wants to follow an 
active policy for the issuance of exploitation licenses, so that both existing and potential 
future areas are explored (Jespersen and Vestergaard 2015: 37).  
 
Further, a whole section of this policy document is devoted to Norway’s cooperation with 
Russia, where it is made clear that Norway needs to work together with Russia “to address 
key challenges” regardless of “Russia’s violations of international law in Ukraine and 
Norway’s response to these” (NMFA 2017: 18). Therefore, while the Norwegian-Russian 
relationship will never be completely independent of the wider Russian-Western relationship, 
it is neither completely reliant on it. In fact, parallel to Russian-Western relations souring, 
Norwegian foreign policy towards Russia has experienced a de facto re-centralization 
(Bourmistrov, Anatoli et al. 2015: 20). The fact that cooperation between Norway and Russia 
has been more successful than cooperation between Russia and the West more generally is a 
puzzle that demands investigation.  
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1.1 Research question  
This thesis considers the following research question:  
Why have Norwegian-Russian petroleum relations in the High North remained cooperative? 
 
The main puzzle of my thesis is what helps maintain the cooperative relationship between 
Norway and Russia in the High North, in relation to petroleum policy. Specifically, I want to 
examine the relationship between Norway and Russia because of their differences in size, 
power, regime type and so on (Hønneland and Jensen 2008). Furthermore, Norway and 
Russia have long been among the most active actors in the region, which makes me wonder 
how these coastal states influence each other’s petroleum strategies, if at all (Zysk and Titley 
2015; Øverland 2010).  
 
Perhaps the most important reason for the High North’s position in Norwegian foreign policy 
is the area’s potential for becoming an important future petroleum province (Jensen 2010: 
295). This petroleum potential is still a key feature of Norway’s Arctic Strategy, and has been 
since the High North Strategy was first published (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
2006: 11; 2009; 2011; 2017: 23; Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 2011). 
 
Aside from what is listed in the various official documents outlining Norway’s strategy in the 
High North, Norway’s petroleum strategy in this region will be defined by the Norwegian 
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (NMPE). The overarching goal of this ministry is to ensure 
high wealth creation through the efficient and environmentally sound management of energy 
resources. Furthermore, cooperation between Norway and Russia in the High North will, 
throughout this thesis, be defined and measured as areas that are opened for exploration and 
the propensity to settle delimitation disputes.  
 
Although much has already been written on the topic of petroleum policy in the High North, 
regarding both Norway and Russia (Alagic 2009; Dingman 2011; Gottemoeller and Tamnes 
2008; Rowe 2014; Slee 2015; Sveberg 2012; Weisser-Svendsen 2007), I have yet to come 
across a scholarly work that incorporates a game theoretical framework to the analysis and 




1.2 Research design 
 
The starting point for my research design is as follows: by exploring Norwegian and Russian 
interests in the High North using game theory, while keeping in mind the cooperative nature 
of their relationship, I will increase my chances of finding a comprehensive answer to the 
research question. This section will introduce my data, theory and method, explain my 
hypotheses and highlight the contribution of my thesis. The use of any method, however, 
requires scrutiny. A discussion of the limitations of game theory and how to potentially 
overcome them will therefore be the purpose of chapter 2. 
 
Data 
This thesis will use document analysis as its main data base (Jensen 2010: 186). The primary 
sources consist of a selection of official documents and statements available from relevant 
Norwegian ministries and directorates (The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, and the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate). 
The secondary sources comprise of industry and academic literature on the topic. This data 
will be analysed with the two hypotheses mentioned below in mind. By incorporating insights 
from the realism literature and taking into account the properties inherent in game theory, I 
will seek answers to my research question. 
 
Two key challenges became apparent in terms of data collection. Firstly, decision makers do 
not necessarily express the true intentions behind any policy decisions they make. It is 
therefore necessary to consider the purpose a statement or document intends to serve, and 
under what circumstances it was formulated, as official information may be selectively 
released to fit political interests. Secondly, some Russian sources were not available to me 
given that their access was restricted, or they were only available in Russian. However, by 
finding official Russian Arctic strategy documents in English and also reading about these 
documents extensively through secondary sources, the hope is that this inconvenience has not 






This thesis will use realism as its main international relations (IR) theory in trying to explain 
the cooperative petroleum relationship between Norway and Russia in the High North. 
Realism is a respected theory about international politics that attempts to explain both the 
behavior of individual states and the characteristics of the international system. The 
ontological reasoning given for realism is that sovereign states are the main components of 
the international system and sovereignty is a political order based on territorial control. The 
international system is therefore anarchical and characterised by self-help. Sovereign states 
are rational actors concerned with relative gains because they must function in an anarchical 
environment in which their security and well-being ultimately rests on their ability to mobilise 
their own resources against external threats. For realists, then, “the basic explanation for the 
behavior of states is the distribution of power in the international system and the place of a 
given state within that distribution” (Krasner 1992: 39).  
 
If such realist reasoning is correct, states will, in the long-run, conform to the pressures 
stemming from the international system. If not, they will be conquered or experience lesser 
forms of deprivation. In the short run, nonetheless, states may fall short of their realist 
aspirations. Normatively, realists warn against policies that attempt to do a lot or very little 
and are unable to align commitments with capabilities. This is true for all states whether they 
are extremely powerful in the international system or possess very few resources. However, 
realists, like advocates of other social science theories, recognise that policymakers will not 
always act according to realist precepts. Finally, although realism is not incompatible with 
democracy, it is not profoundly connected with democracy either (ibid, 41-50). This theory 
can, as a result, be used to understand Norwegian as well as Russian behavior and intentions 
in the High North, and illustrate why these two states choose to cooperative on petroleum 








At its most basic, game theory is “about anticipating each other’s choices” and coping “with 
influencing other’s choices” (Schelling 2010: 27). In this respect, a "game" is any situation in 
which several players have to make decisions that depend on results that affect them all. 
Chess or poker are classic examples of such situations, but the definition is broad enough to 
cover phenomena such as military conflict or economic competition. The foundations of 
decision theory are therefore dependent on the fact that a player must make their tactical 
move based on the extent of its consequences. Each consequence will subsequently depend 
not only on the player’s own decision, but on his or her opponents’ decisions. In most real-life 
cases, consequences associated with moves also depend on external factors, such as the 
international context, whose uncertainty is obvious (Attali 1972: 78). 
If one equates game theoretical models to King, Keohane, and Verba’s (1994) four 
characteristics of scientific research, it becomes clear that game theory belongs within the 
realm of social scientific research, and political research more specifically. These four 
characteristics are outlined below: 
1. The goal is inference. The deductive logic employed by these techniques aim to 
provide an explanation for various aspects of social interactions, ranging from general 
principles to specific inferences. 
2. The procedures are public. The rigor of formal analyses and the explicit presentation 
of assumptions make this a public undertaking. 
3. The conclusions are uncertain. Game theoretic models are especially good at 
providing unexpected results. In this way, the formal structure of such models often 
help to challenge conventional wisdom.  
4. The content is the method. Game theoretical models are characterized by a set of 
specific rules that guide the procedure by which a political phenomenon is analysed 
(Gates and Humes 1997: 6-7). 
 
The game theoretical design incorporated into my thesis is in line with the economics 
literature on repeated games, with a focus on infinite games (Dixit, Skeath, and Reiley 2015). 
Repeated games are those in which a fixed set of players, Norway and Russia in this case, 
play the same game against each other several times. The hope is that if players play this 
game an infinite number of times, they will be able to sustain a cooperative outcome, as this 
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will be in the interest of both players. However, this is a contingent strategy because it 
specifies how a player will play dependent on how the opponent behaves in the game. In 
short, the literature explains that the possibility of cooperation in repeated games depends 
largely on three criteria. These include how patient players are, the actual magnitude of the 
payoff that players obtain from the various possible outcomes, and the length of the game 
(Glaser 1995: 82).  
 
Schelling’s discoveries relating to scenarios where a mix of conflict and mutual interests 
preside in game theory, can be applied to a situation where interests are largely aligned by 
way of tacit coordination. This can be said to be the case when it comes to Norwegian-
Russian petroleum relations, as these states have significant mutual interests in the High 
North. As such, pure coordination is a game of strategy equivalent to a strategy of conflict. 
Imagine a game in which each player’s best choice depends on the action he expects the other 
player to take, which he knows depends on what the other’s expectation of his own move is. 
Such interdependence of the expectations of players is what separates a game of strategy from 
a simple game of chance or skill. In such circumstances, players’ convergence of expectations 
is crucial in order to create focal points that normally arise out of considerations that have 
their foundation outside the pure formalities of the game (Dixit 2006: 220-1).  
 
Several models could have provided the analytical backdrop for this thesis and the research 
question chosen, but game theory has been selected mainly because of its previous use in 
political science works and to bring the disciplines of economics and political science closer 
together. Employing a game theoretical framework, this thesis will evaluate the two 
hypotheses outlined below against the negotiations leading up to the Varangerfjord 
Agreement, the Grey Zone Agreement and the Delimitation Agreement. These agreements 
have been chosen because they are all significant from a petroleum policy perspective. 
However, rather than being a case study analysis, this thesis will use the three agreements 
outlined above as examples of why the hypotheses chosen can help explain why Norwegian-







In light of my literature review and the insights obtained from realism and game theory, I 
have developed two main hypotheses regarding my research question, and these are as 
follows:  
 
H1: Norwegian-Russian petroleum relations in the High North have remained cooperative 
because of mutual interests in the region 
 
H2: Norwegian-Russian petroleum relations in the High North have remained cooperative 
because both states can benefit from the others’ petroleum resources and expertise  
 
The hypotheses outlined above are based on the data collected and the agreements looked 
into. To exemplify, Roberts writes that Russia will likely play by the rules in the High North, 
citing that Russia’s High North interests are best addressed through diplomacy (2015: 125). 
Furthermore, she importantly identifies that the High North is not Ukraine or Crimea, and that 
the heightened Western mistrust of President Putin should therefore not be transferred to 
Russia’s dealings in the High North, as the stakes are high and the historical context matters 
(ibid). Such arguments are also interesting given that Norway’s Arctic strategy stresses the 
need for cooperation with Russia, almost regardless of Russia’s condemned actions in 
Ukraine and elsewhere (NMFA 2017: 18).  
 
Correspondingly, Staun explains that Russia has so far followed a non-assertive foreign 
policy in the High North because of its desire to eventually exploit the resource and sea route 
potential in the region (2017: 328). Similar views are also echoed elsewhere in the literature, 
with a focus on Russia’s long-term desire to establish itself as an energy superpower 
confidently able to supply its large European energy market (Bouzarovski and Bassin 2011; 
Godzimirski 2011; Monaghan 2007; Tayloe 2015: 9). Given that these hypotheses are not 
mutually exclusive, they may act together to explain the cooperative petroleum relationship 
between Norway and Russia in the High North. Equally, because they do not cover all 
possible explanatory factors, none of these hypotheses may be able to fully explain why this 





Contribution of the thesis 
 
This thesis is situated between two fields of research: one is concerned with the wider issues 
pertaining to the High North, such as petroleum, fisheries, climate, indigenous peoples, and so 
on. The other field is concerned with Norwegian-Russian relations, as well as foreign and 
security policy. By combining these two fields of research, all the while incorporating a game 
theoretical approach, I hope to bring these different social science disciplines closer together.  
 
Examining Norway and Russia’s High North relations via a game theoretical analysis adds 
another dimension to the discourse analysis, making my thesis interdisciplinary. The hope is 
that the application of this framework to the literature will, alongside the insights provided by 
realism, help shed some light on the reasons why Norway and Russia do cooperate on 
petroleum matters in this region, and which variables make a difference to this relationship 
(Bourmistrov et al. 2015). This is particularly interesting given the complex political 
dynamics between these two petroleum players and the wider relationship between Russia and 
the West (Granovetter 1985; Uzzi 1997).  
 
 
1.4 Thesis outline 
 
This thesis consists of seven chapters of which this introduction constitutes the first. Chapter 
2 will delve into the limitations of game theory as a framework for analysis. The main 
features of game theory that will be discussed include weaknesses relating to rationality, Nash 
equilibrium, the inability to monitor, utility functions, and repeated games. This is not an 
exhaustive list of weaknesses inherent in this framework, but rather an attempt to highlight 
some of the most troublesome features of this approach.  
 
Chapter 3 will provide some historical background on the cooperative petroleum relations 
between Norway and Russia in the High North, and give an overview of key points from the 
relevant literature. This chapter is divided into seven key headings, which highlight 
significant issues or features of the literature on this topic. These headings include ‘Definition 
of the High North’, ‘The harsh climate of the High North’, ‘The importance of access to 
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petroleum resources’, ‘Potential petroleum reserves in the High North’, ‘The issue of climate 
change’, ‘Russia’s High North strategy’ and ‘Russia’s relationship with the West’.  
 
Chapter 4 will deal with H1 to scrutinize this possible explanation for the petroleum 
cooperation between Norway and Russia in this region. This chapter will discuss the 
hypothesis stating that Norwegian-Russian petroleum relations in the High North have 
remained cooperative because of mutual interests in the region. First, mutual interests 
between these two states will be evaluated. Then, potential conflicts of interest between 
Norway and Russia will be highlighted. The chapter will end with an analysis of how game 
theory fits with this hypothesis.  
 
Chapter 5 will deal with H2 to scrutinize this possible explanation for the petroleum 
cooperation between Norway and Russia in this region. This chapter will discuss the 
hypothesis stating that Norwegian-Russian petroleum relations in the High North have 
remained cooperative because both states can benefit from the others’ petroleum resources 
and expertise. The chapter will begin by evaluating the state of petroleum developments 
today. Russian dependence on Norwegian petroleum technology will then be discussed. Next, 
Norwegian dependence on Russian petroleum fields will be considered. This chapter will end 
with an analysis of how game theory fits with this perceived petroleum interdependence.  
 
Chapter 6 will analyze the cooperative petroleum relationship between Norway and Russia in 
the High North by means of the Varangerfjord Agreement, the Grey Zone Agreement and the 
Delimitation Agreement. These agreements have been chosen because they build on each 
other from a time perspective. Although they were initially intended to relax tensions between 
Norwegian and Russian fishing vessels operating in this area, these negotiations were also 
influenced by both states’ hope to eventually explore and extract petroleum resources on the 
Arctic seabed. This chapter will start off by explaining how negotiations can be viewed 
through the lens of game theory and then proceed to discuss the three agreements mentioned 
above in chronological order.   
 
The ordering of chapters 4-6 is not random, but rather signifies the respective chapters’ 
importance to the thesis formulation. Rather than being a case study analysis, this thesis hopes 
to shed light on some of the factors that may help explain why Norwegian-Russian petroleum 
relations in the High North have remained cooperative. Therefore, chapter 6, which discusses 
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previous important agreements between Norway and Russia in the High North, is intended to 
exemplify how game theory can be used to make the case for mutual interests or petroleum 
interdependence as explanatory variables. In other words, this thesis will not use these three 
agreements as cases to be explained via game theory, but rather as examples of how the 
hypotheses chosen can help explain why Norwegian-Russian petroleum relations in the High 
North have remained cooperative.  
 
Chapter 7 will provide a discussion of the previous chapters and concluding remarks. This 
final chapter will start by discussing the main findings of the two hypotheses analysed in 
relation to the agreements presented. Further, this chapter will highlight the implications of 
the main findings and evaluate which other variables could have been hypothesized to explain 
this bilateral relationship. After, suggestions will be given for further research relevant to the 
research question. This chapter will then highlight how, if attempted again, this thesis 






















2 Limitations of game theory 
 
Game theory has become popular in works of political science because of its ability to use 
mathematical language to model strategic interactions between players (Morton 1999: 82). 
Nevertheless, game theory, like any method, has its limitations. This chapter will discuss the 
most striking of these limitations, and how they may impact the conclusions drawn in relation 
to the research question at hand.  
Although game theory predictions often work well, not all of them are confirmed by 
experimental evidence. Weaknesses often alluded to when talking about game theory are 
those related to rationality, Nash equilibrium, the inability to monitor, utility functions, and 
repeated games. This is not an exhaustive list of weaknesses inherent in this framework, but 
rather a way of underlining the main issues associated with using game theory for political 
science questions.  
 
 
2.1 Rationality  
 
Perhaps the most important assumption of players in game theoretical situations, is their 
rationality. In this respect, players in games are supposed to be instrumentally rational. This 
means that they will most likely act in their own self-interest and have the ability to 
probabilistically determine the outcome of their own actions. The overriding assumption in 
game theory is that each player in a game is a pure egoist, only concerned with maximizing 
their own payoff (Taylor 1987: 109). Given the complexity of most decisions, and the sheer 
volume of information that needs to be analysed by players, this assumption of rationality 
appears unrealistic. This is as the use of instrumental rationality by individuals may serve to 
be self-defeating. Players may, in fact, protect their own self-interest better if they act in ways 
not deemed to be instrumentally rational. Secondly, the solution to a game based on 
instrumental rationality is often indeterminant. When such a scenario is present, non-rational 
considerations must be added to make predictions about games (Dixit, Skeath and Reiley 
2015: 263). Thirdly, evidence from experimental studies suggest that players, rather than 
being fully rational, make complex decisions based on suboptimal, simplistic rules. This is as 
players are mutually interdependent in these situations. This means that the welfare of one 
player is determined by the actions of other players in the game, at least to some extent, and 
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this leads players to act strategically rather than purely basing their moves on instrumental 
rationality (Romp 1997: 2-4; Sen 1977).  
 
Elster divides the theories surrounding rational behavior into two different strands, the 
instrumental and the substantive. The first may be said to encompass Harsanyi’s three 
theories. This instrumental theory deems a move to be rational if it complies with the player’s 
beliefs and desires, and as a combination these may be referred to as the player’s reasons. The 
most important concept in this theory is consistency. A rational actor has consistent 
preferences and beliefs, and act on these accordingly. This concept excludes the possibility 
for weakness of will and contradictions in a player’s behavior (Hovi and Rasch 1993: 23-24). 
However, players in game theoretical scenarios can move away from their self-interested 
nature to behave reciprocally. Reciprocity entails that players, in response to friendly moves 
from their opponent, act more cooperatively than envisioned by traditional, self-interest 
predictions. Contrastingly, when faced with uncooperative behavior by their opponent, 
players often respond by being more brutal (Fehr and Gächter 2000: 159-160). Such behavior 
may not even be motivated by potential future payoffs in repeated games, sometimes referred 
to as the “shadow of the future” (Bó and Fréchette 2018: 109). In the case of reciprocity, 
players may respond to cooperative or uncooperative behavior irrespective of whether 
behaving cooperatively now means the future will hold potential payoffs. The same goes for 
altruism, as altruism received does not equal altruism given, but rather is a response based on 
unconditional kindness (Fehr and Gächter 2000: 160).  
 
A conditional strategy is therefore one in which a player decides what to do based on the 
actions of other players in the game. This allows a player to use a punishment strategy with 
another player if his or her actions deviate from the desired, or Pareto-efficient, outcome. If an 
equilibrium is Pareto-efficient, no individual player in the game can be made better off 
without making someone else worse off (Romp 1997: 4). Thus, if the threat of punishment is 
sufficiently severe and appears credible, players will be deterred from deviating (Dixit, 
Skeath, and Reiley 2015: 36). For instance, the trigger strategy entails that a player will play 
cooperatively as long as his or her opponent does so, but any defection will trigger a period of 
punishment, in which the player will not cooperate. This strategy is also known as tit-for-tat, 
since it entails that a player will cooperate with his or her opponent as long as they do. A 
harsher version of this strategy is known as the grim strategy, whereby a player, if faced with 
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defection from his or her opponent once, will defect in every consecutive round for the 
entirety of the game (ibid, 381; Jervis 1988: 339).  
 
In this sense, relations between states may produce either enormous trust or enormous 
distrust. Thankfully, the continuity of relationships could help to generate behavior that would 
otherwise be viewed as foolish or even purely altruistic (Granovetter 1985: 492). This is as 
reputation matters to countries. An international negotiation, for instance, is never conducted 
in a vacuum, or a so-called self-contained game, but rather is part of an infinite supergame 
(Bó and Fréchette 2018). While each part of the negotiation has its own, distinct payoffs, the 
tactics employed will affect the strategy of the other player in later stages and thus affect 
future payoffs. A player’s strategy is therefore a complete plan of action that specifies how a 
player should act in response to all the various situations that might confront them during the 
course of playing a game. Generally, supergames only end in the event of exceptional 
circumstances, for instance if a government ceases to exist or if a government expects no 
continuity in the current bilateral relationship and may therefore consider the losing 
circumstances to end the supergame (Iklé 1964: 77).  
 
As a result, political relationships tend to persist over time. States therefore expect to 
negotiate with one another for the foreseeable future, and not just presently. This anticipation 
may serve to alter the strategic logic of games. Players need not only consider immediate 
consequences of their moves, but rather the effect these moves will have in future stages of 
the relationship. Therefore, the benefits incurred in the future may outweigh the immediate 
payoffs associated with defecting. Likewise, a state may threaten to end the bilateral 
relationship in order to secure short-term exploitation of the other state (Morrow 1994: 260). 
In this respect, it is important to keep in mind that a promise or a threat to do something is 
credible if, and only if, it is in the interest of the player who makes the promise or threat to 
actually carry it out when called upon to do so. Thus, given that players are rational, and 
given also that both the rationality of the players and the structure of the game are common 
knowledge, it is reasonable to infer that players will not believe threats or promises that are 







2.2 Nash equilibrium  
 
Perhaps the most important concept in game theory is that of Nash equilibrium (Kalai and 
Lehrer 1993a: 1019). This concept is still viewed as the most influential way of going from 
mere descriptions of situations to predicting the moves of players (Ordeshook 1986: 118). 
However, there is still no common understanding among game theorists when it comes to 
Nash equilibria fine-tuning. Nash equilibria rather assume that a player has a common 
understanding of which strategies the other player may play. Thus, at a Nash equilibrium 
point, each individual player has maximised his own benefit provided that all other players' 
strategies have been given (Binmore 2007; Hermansson 1990: 107). As such, no player can 
get a better payoff by switching to some other strategy that is available to them while all the 
other players adhere to the strategies specified to them. This understanding ensures that 
players know that these strategies are best replies. An alternative to this is rational learning by 
way of repeated games. In such circumstances, players start with hypotheses about which 
strategies the other player may employ. The other player then responds with their best replies 
and given this gradual understanding, players update their strategy as they observe the actions 
of other players in the game. In this way, the players learn to play the game, one move at a 
time (Morrow 1994: 305-306). 
 
It has been demonstrated by Fudenberg and Levine (1993) and Kalai and Lehrer (1993) that 
repeated games lead to rational learning. This line of reasoning entails that players will 
eventually end up playing a Nash equilibrium. However, the process by which players learn 
to play Nash equilibrium, is not fully understood. For instance, if a game is played only once 
and players have no prior experience to guide them, it should come as no surprise to observers 
that learning is limited to any theories the players may have about previous models of how to 
best play the game. Similarly, if the game does not have enough rounds of play, players may 
have a great deal of information about the strategies they have chosen to play, but players 
may not have much incentive to invest in exploring many strategies. Consequently, play may 
fail to be Nash because untested beliefs about the play of other players off the equilibrium 
path are not correct (Fudenberg and Levine 1993b: 563). In repeated games, on the other 
hand, where players have more time to observe the strategies of other players, the hope is that 
statistical learning theory will eventually lead players to the equilibrium path of play (Kalai 
and Lehrer 1993a: 1019). 
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The notion of a self-confirming equilibrium was initially introduced by Fudenberg and Levine 
(1993b) for finite extensive form games, but can also be extended to infinite games. A player 
in such a game chooses a strategy to maximise his expected payoff given his beliefs about the 
strategies of other players (Kalai and Lehrer 1993b: 1231-1232). In a self-confirming 
equilibrium, each player’s strategy is a best response to his beliefs about the play of his 
opponents, and each player’s beliefs are correct along the equilibrium path of play. Therefore, 
if a self-confirming equilibrium happens several times, no player ever observes play that 
contradicts his beliefs. The concept of self-confirming equilibrium is driven by the idea that 
non-cooperative equilibria should be viewed as part of a learning process, whereby players 
revise their strategies in light of information obtained in previous rounds of play (Fudenberg 
and Levine 1993a: 523).  
 
To complicate matters further, repeated games tend to open up for the possibility of multiple 
equilibria. In order to avoid not choosing a Pareto-dominated equilibrium, players my select a 
focal point in the wide array of equilibria. Focal points may be set by assigning different 
payoffs or creating societal differences between strategies or outcomes that are not directly 
specified in the game. In this way, common experience or convention may also serve to create 
focal points (Morrow 1994: 305-306). However, using focal points to solve games with 
multiple equilibria is not as straightforward as it may sound. Experimental evidence 
demonstrates that such refinements often are unable to predict real-life behavior in repeated 
games (Morton 1999: 193).  
 
 
2.3 The inability to monitor 
 
Another common issue in the game theory literature is the inability to monitor, which is 
related to the problem of multiple equilibria. In repeated play, a prediction is made regarding 
which equilibrium will be selected. In this respect, it is important to keep in mind that the 
value of future reputation always trumps the advantage gained by defecting in the short term. 
Thus, it is crucial that the state believes that its present behavior will affect its reputation in 
the future (Kreps 1990: 529-533). Clearly, it is more tempting to break the rules of an 
agreement if this is likely not to be noticed by the other state and there will be no 
repercussions, particularly if the length of the game is unspecified or unknown. This has been 
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mentioned in relation to arms control (Brams 1985) and signifies the importance of being able 
to monitor the other player’s behavior, even after an agreement has been ratified. The 
importance of this can also be applied to the agreements underpinning Norwegian-Russian 
petroleum relations in the High North, as actually adhering to the agreements signed is more 
important than the process involved in settling disputes. It is, however, not always possible to 
monitor the other state after an agreement has been signed and put into force (Hovi and Rasch 
1993: 82-86).  
 
 
2.4 Utility functions 
 
Game theory is also based on the assumption that the two players in the game know each 
other’s utility functions. This means that they are aware of one another’s preferences and 
attitudes towards risk. Given this, the theory lays out optimal strategies for both players, and 
also predicts the outcome of bargaining between these two rational players (Shubik 1973). 
Nash (1950) provides the original definition of the bargaining game and solves it by 
demonstrating that particular assumptions lead players of the game to pick a certain 
agreement (Axelrod 1967: 89). Within bargaining situations, then, the behavior of a rational 
player would depend on his expectations regarding the other player. However, if players did 
actually know one another’s utility functions, there would be no need for traditional 
bargaining. This is as the players would not need to try out one another’s utility functions by 
presenting successive bids and counterbids. Instead, the players could simply state their final 
terms independently and compare one another’s bids. If they were compatible, each player 
would get what they wanted. Even if players did not know one another’s utility functions, but 
bluffing was rampant, bargaining would not lead to any useful information being obtained by 
the players (ibid; Pen 1952). Thankfully, in the real world, there is scope for true bargaining 
as states do not know one another’s utility functions and there are reasons to avoid 
unnecessary bluffing (Harsanyi 1962a: 29-37).  
 
 
2.5 Repeated games 
 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game can help explain how states interact with each other 
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under tacit circumstances when the game is repeated. This game has two players. Each player 
has two choices, either to cooperate or to defect. Each player has to make their move without 
knowing what the other player will do. Regardless of what the other player does, defection 
always yields a higher payoff than cooperation. The dilemma, however, is that if both players 
choose to defect, both will end up worse off than if both had cooperated. The game is played 
out as follows: One player chooses a row, and then chooses either to cooperate or defect. 
Simultaneously, the other player chooses a column, either cooperating or defecting. If both 
players choose to cooperate, both get payoff R, the reward for mutual cooperation. If one 
player chooses to cooperate, but the other defects, the defecting player gets payoff T, while 
the cooperating player gets payoff S, the sucker’s payoff. If both defect, both get payoff P, the 
punishment for mutual defection. These properties mean that it is better to defect if you think 
the other player will cooperate, and it is better to defect if you think the other player will 
defect. So, no matter what the other player does, it pays for you to defect. The same logic 
holds for the other player. In this way, individual rationality leads to a worse outcome for 
both than what is possible, and that is the nature of the dilemma (Axelrod 2006: 7-9). Figure 1 
below illustrates a typical Prisoner’s Dilemma game and its associated payoffs.  
 
 Cooperate Defect 
Cooperate R = 3, R= 3                    
Reward for mutual 
cooperation 
S = 0, T = 5                  
Sucker’s payoff, and 
temptation to defect 
Defect T = 5, S = 0           
Temptation to defect and 
sucker’s payoff 
P = 1, P = 1              
Punishment for mutual 
defection 
 
Figure 1. The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (ibid, 9).  
 
 
The main features of the game illustrated above can be summarised into three distinct 
properties. The first is that each player has a dominant strategy. The second is that if each 
player follows their dominant strategy, the outcome of the game will be Pareto-inferior, 
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because both players can find some other outcome that they unanimously prefer. Third, and 
finally, the strategies are dominant because they imply that even if the players can 
communicate before the game began, this will not serve to avoid the Pareto-inferior outcome. 
Unless the players can make an effective and binding agreement before the game starts, each 
player will ultimately defect from the Pareto-optimal outcome (Ordeshook 1986: 207).  
 
Even if issues of international politics, according to realism, must remain a PD, this game can 
sometimes be altered so that it is more benign in nature. This can be done by changing the 
payoffs to encourage cooperation, for example by increasing the transparency that allows 
each state to view what the other state is doing and understand why it is doing it. The 
knowledge that even if the other state in the game is benign today, it may become hostile in 
the future due to a change in circumstances, may equally force state officials to create 
arrangements that bind themselves and their partners. Realism, however, cannot explain why 
deeper forms of cooperation, that are more problematic from this perspective, exist between 
states (Jervis 1998: 987). 
 
Game theorists often model repeated versions of the PD game to learn how to represent 
cooperative agreements as Nash equilibria. However, a cooperative outcome cannot be 
secured merely by making sure that a game is played repeatedly. Imagine a PD game that is 
played several times by the same two players and where both players know starting out the 
number of rounds of play the game will have. If behaving rationally, a player should 
cooperate early on in the game, in the hope that the other player will cooperate in future 
rounds. Notice in a PD game that there is no reason to cooperate in the last round, as 
cooperation cannot yield any future payoffs. In the last round, then, each player should 
employ their dominant strategy, which is to defect. However, this reasoning also means that 
cooperating in the second-to-last round is meaningless because both players know that this 
will not yield cooperation in the last round of the game. The conclusion reached from this line 
of reasoning is that both players should defect in the very first round of the game, and in 
every round following, until the game inevitably ends (Ordeshook 1986: 443-444). 
 
While this example demonstrates that merely repeating a game does not yield cooperation 
between the players, many dilemmas found within the realm of politics differ from this 
scenario. In real life, players often do not know when a game will end or, indeed, if it will 
ever end. State officials, for instance, would like to believe that the timeline of their country is 
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infinite. In order to model such situations, an extensive form representation of the game with 
infinite repetitions is needed. Analysing such extensive form games by way of backwards 
induction and subgame perfection, however, is impossible because the end point of the game 
is either unknown or non-existent. In the case of an infinitely repeated game, then, some 
simplifying assumptions about the available strategies in the game must be laid out. In such a 
game, there are always more strategies available than can be described as there will be an 
infinite number of rounds with an infinite number of conditional responses. In the defence of 
game theorists, nevertheless, it seems fair to say that players in such games simplify their 
decisions and adopt certain heuristics as strategies when confronted with such complex 
circumstances (ibid; Hovi 1998: 93). Keeping this in mind, a subgame is the part of an 
extensive form game that remains to be played beginning from any node at which the entire 
history of the game up to that point is common knowledge in that both players know that the 
subgame begins at that node in the game. The notion of subgame perfection is thus a 
refinement of the Nash equilibrium because, in order to count as a subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium, a set of strategies must be both a Nash equilibrium and not involve non-credible 
promises or threats (Grieco 1988). 
 
Non-cooperative game theory employs two different types of representation to understand 
situations. These include the extensive form and the normal form. The extensive form 
contains information on whose move it is at any particular point in time, which alternative 
actions are available to each person at any particular move, what each player knows about the 
other player’s preceding moves, and what each player’s utilities over outcomes are. Thus, the 
extensive form consists of a game tree that has several features highlighting the relationship 
between moves and their outcomes:  
1. The game tree has a finite set of nodes. Some of these are terminal nodes, which 
indicate outcomes of the game. The remaining nodes represent choice nodes, which 
are points of choice by a designated player in the game.  
2. From each such node there is a branch assigned to each move that a player can choose 
at that point in the game.  
3. The tree indicates the sequences of choices. Therefore, its base consists of a single 
choice node, which represents the game’s first move, or starting point. Each of the 
branches from the starting point connects to the next point in the game if a player 
chooses that option as the first move. If this point is an end node, however, the game 
ends. If it is not, this is the next choice node in the game, and so on.  
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4. The information sets in the game tree showcase the uncertainty of the player who will 
move next about the preceding choices that the other player in the game has made. If 
the information set contains only one choice node, then the player who makes a move 
at this point knows the location of the choice in the tree, but if the information set 
contains more than one node, then the player knows that the game has reached one of 
the nodes in this information set, but is not aware of which one it is.  
 
The remaining conditions deal more with the players themselves than with the rules of the 
game, as the extensive form summarises them. The extensive form includes the utility 
functions of the players and these are outlined in terms of the tree’s end points. Additionally, 
each player knows, and expects the other player to know, all the information available about 
the situation that the game tree presents, any player knows that the other player knows that he 
or she knows the tree, and so on. In the language of game theory, therefore, the game tree can 
be said to be common knowledge (Ordeshook 1986: 99-102). Figure 2 below is an example of 





Figure 2. Extensive Form Representation of a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (Gates and Humes 
1997: 99).  
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The extensive form of any game, like the Prisoner’s Dilemma game above, can represent 
specific details about a given set of circumstances. Even relatively simple games, such as tic-
tac-toe or poker, may nonetheless be too complex to be described at length. Therefore, it may 
be necessary to forsake insignificant details and rather focus solely on the more general 
features of the game. Another solution would be to focus attention on just one part of the 
game tree. For instance, developing a game tree for only the next five moves of a specific 
game would simplify the analysis. Understandably, every extensive form game must be 
incomplete, because the only fully complete form of the game models the entire future. 
Nonetheless, the extensive form of a game can help highlight the basic principles of game 
theory and set the stage for analysing any unique game (Ordeshook 1986: 103).  
 
Finally, it is worth defending the use of game theory in this thesis. The basic orientation of 
game theoretic modelling is toward the development of general explanations. Even so, many 
applications of game theory in the political science literature have simply attempted to figure 
out whether events like the Cuban Missile Crisis, perhaps the most dangerous confrontation 
between the United States and the Soviet Union (SU) ever (Brams 1985: 48-51), was really a 
case of the Chicken or the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Such an approach may adapt an already 
established game theoretical model to fit a particular situation, but does not help generate new 
predictions about similar situations (Gates and Humes 1997: 7). 
 
However, like other social science models, game theoretic models do not try to address all 
complexities inherent in social interactions. The value of these models is rather derived from 
their ability to develop elegant explanations for complex issues. This means that only the 
relevant players and moves are evaluated, but additional assumptions may be evaluated as the 
sophistication of the model increases (ibid, 8). In this way, it is worth employing a game 
theoretic analysis to the study of Norwegian-Russian petroleum relations in the High North to 
simplify the analysis by only looking at these two states and limiting the selection of variables 
to the two hypotheses outlined in the previous chapter. The next chapter will provide some 
background regarding the circumstances surrounding Norwegian-Russian cooperative 
petroleum relations in the High North, and thereby help position these two states in the wider 





3 Background  
 
This chapter provides an overview of the circumstances surrounding the cooperative 
relationship between Norway and Russia in the High North, with an emphasis on petroleum 
relations. This chapter is divided into seven key headings, which highlight significant issues 
or features of the literature on this topic. These headings include ‘Definition of the High 
North’, ‘The harsh climate of the High North’, ‘The importance of access to petroleum 
resources’, ‘Potential petroleum reserves in the High North’, ‘The issue of climate change’, 
‘Russia’s High North strategy’ and ‘Russia’s relationship with the West’.  
 
 
3.1 Definition of the High North 
 
There are several ways in which the Arctic, or the High North as it will be referred to 
throughout this thesis, can be defined. The most common way of defining the region is by 
including everything above 66° and 32 minutes north of the polar circle. This line of latitude 
denotes northern and southern zones of the Earth where, for at least one day per year, the sun 
neither sets nor rises. This definition has been favoured because of its definitional precision 
and as it is politically more inclusive, adding three more Arctic states to the equation, making 
for an ‘Arctic 8’. This definition includes the eight states that have territory above the Arctic 
Circle, and therefore includes Iceland, Finland and Sweden. Contrastingly, the five Arctic 
littoral states are the states that have Arctic coastlines and can claim exclusive rights to 
resources within their respective 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), and these are 
Canada, the United States, Denmark, Norway and Russia (Ermida 2015: 170; Tamnes and 
Offerdal 2014: 99-100). A limitation of this definition, however, is that it has little 
climatological meaning, which is often the defining characteristic of how the Arctic region is 
perceived around the world (Hough 2013: 4; Mazo 2015).  
 
Unfortunately, no precise definition of the High North is conveyed within Norwegian politics. 
It is clear, however, that the region is broader than Northern Norway and Svalbard as Norway 
has interests to safeguard further north and further south than this. The definition may 
therefore encompass areas as far south as 62° latitude. In 2006, when the government’s High 
North Strategy was developed, the High North denoted areas surrounding the Barents Sea. In 
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this regard, particularly with a view to secure closer international cooperation, the High North 
is gradually becoming more synonymous with the word Arctic, which is used more frequently 
and more consistently internationally (Hønneland and Rowe 2010b; Schönfeldt 2017: 154). 
The words High North and Arctic will, as a result, be used interchangeably throughout this 
thesis to describe the region in question. 
 
 
3.2 The harsh climate of the High North 
Historically, the harsh climate of the High North has limited its visitors to experts. This is 
because it is a region that is difficult to access. While sea ice hinders shipping during the 
winter, the thawed permafrost makes transport on land difficult in summer. Nevertheless, 
Norway has always had strong interests in this icy area. In fact, one third of mainland Norway 
lies north of the Arctic Circle, and Norwegian jurisdiction in the Barents Sea and the Arctic 
covers an area six times greater than the size of mainland Norway (Orheim 2006: 26). 
Though there are several interested parties undertaking projects in the High North, the pace of 
developments is likely to be slower than forecasts suggest. This primarily comes down to two 
factors. The first of these is the difficult operating conditions and climate in this region. The 
second factor is the availability of other development opportunities in more readily accessible 
areas. While forecasts suggest that the region’s sea ice cover may become thinner and allow 
for navigable waters for longer periods than has been the case previously, this is not an 
absolute certainty. Even so, the amount of ice predicted in the future will still serve to trouble 
operations in the area. This is problematic, given the added costs to platforms, ships and 
pipelines used for exploration, extraction, and transportation of oil and gas. These operations, 
therefore, have to be built to a more robust standard than is the case in other parts of the 
world, to reduce damage from the ice (Johnston 2012: 17).  
 
3.3 The importance of access to petroleum resources 
Petroleum has since the mid-1950s been the most important source of energy worldwide. 
And, according to experts, world energy supply will still be heavily based on petroleum 
resources in 2030. Even then, only 10% of world energy supplies will consist of renewable 
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energy sources according to forecasts from the International Energy Agency (IEA). Thus, it 
would not be wrong to claim that the world is still driven by petroleum, and will be for years 
to come (Rottem, Jensen and Hønneland 2008: 64). As a result, secure and stable access to 
petroleum is a key geopolitical element in today’s world. Many of the world’s major sources 
of traditional fossil fuel or crude oil reserves are presently found in volatile regions and 
finding secure reserves elsewhere is therefore high on the agenda (Gottemoeller and Tamnes 
2009: 41). The idea that the Barents Sea may become an important petroleum province is 
believed by many, but more research is certainly needed before it will be known what 
petroleum resources can be found on either side of the Norwegian-Russian border. In 2007, 
nonetheless, the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) estimated that as much as 30% of 
all potential undiscovered Norwegian oil and gas could reside in the Barents Sea. Before these 
resources may be extracted, however, the rights of states to access and use these petroleum 
resources need to be resolved (Jensen and Rottem 2009: 78; Hønneland and Rowe 2010b: 
118; Rottem, Jensen and Hønneland 2008: 70).  
 
Energy security is crucial for both net energy suppliers and importers. While the former 
attempts to balance short-term profit with the need for security of demand from satisfied 
partners, the latter seeks secure supplies at manageable prices, preferably without political 
strings attached. Among the Arctic states, Norway and Russia are well-established petroleum 
exporters. The potential for exploiting Arctic petroleum resources gives these two states 
possible insurance against the exhaustion of existing petroleum reserves and may provide 
Russia with a new and easier solution for exporting oil and gas to Asia. From a longer-term 
perspective, exploring and extracting petroleum reserves in this region might also offer extra 
capacity for the increasing energy needs of growing economies and help to relieve the current 
Western and Asian reliance on reserves from the politically unstable Middle East (Jakobsen 
and Melvin 2016: 26-28; Kratochvil and Tichy 2013). 
 
In light of the above, the world clearly needs energy. The IEA envisages that energy demand 
will increase by roughly 45% in the years leading up to 2030. Furthermore, the production of 
oil and gas will increasingly take place in a limited number of countries, most notably from 
the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) (Sørenes 2009: 16). In this 
regard, the petroleum sector is significant for Norway, particularly for its export sector. It is 
crucial for Norway to remain a reliable petroleum exporter to decrease the relative energy 
monopoly of OPEC states. As of today, a large amount of Norway’s petroleum reserves have 
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already been exploited and extracted, but the state’s Arctic and Barents Sea waters have high 
estimates of undiscovered resources. Moreover, while the petroleum sector is significant, the 
Arctic also has a strong strategic and identity significance for Norwegians and Norway more 
generally (Keil 2014: 176; Maugeri 2003).   
 
It is worth mentioning that, as Norway is a mouse compared to the Russian bear, it is 
necessary for Norway to cooperate with other states in securing its interests in the Arctic. 
Presently, many states that are strategically vulnerable to a loss of Norwegian energy 
production, such as Germany and the UK, share a clear interest in the shaping of Norwegian 
foreign and petroleum policy, and are generally happy to help secure the Arctic region 
(Austvik 2007: 22). There is currently some Norwegian petroleum activity in the area 
commonly referred to as the High North. As per May 2017, there are 71 production licenses 
in the Barents Sea. The first were awarded in 1980, and the first well was drilled in the same 
year. From 1980 until 2016, 49 discoveries were made. The first, Askeladd, part of the current 
Snøhvit field, was made in 1981. The most northerly well, Atlantis, was drilled in 2014 and 
resulted in a small gas discovery. Today, only two fields are under production in the Barents 
Sea, namely Snøhvit and Goliat (The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate 2017: 7). These two 
fields can be seen in figure 10, which illustrates the process of the Delimitation Agreement 
and petroleum discoveries in the Barents Sea. 
 
While Norway, on the whole, should be considered a small power on the international scene, 
Norway is up there with the great powers within the realm of petroleum. This is particularly 
true in terms of technological innovation and expertise. It is therefore no secret that Norway 
hopes to supply Russia with its technology to secure cooperation between these two states’ 
economies and petroleum companies, particularly in the High North. Additionally, domestic 
pressures and the need for urgent access to petroleum resources could affect the willingness to 
negotiate agreements and push both states to cooperate. Regardless, economic and 
technological interdependence between the relevant states in this region serve to raise the 
conflict threshold (Jensen and Rottem 2010: 78-9). This argument provides leverage for the 
second hypothesis stating that Norwegian-Russian petroleum relations in the High North have 
remained cooperative because both states can benefit from the others’ petroleum resources 
and expertise. While Russia hopes to rely on Norwegian technology in order to exploit its 
petroleum reserves in the High North, Norway hopes to benefit from these reserves as a thank 
you for facilitating their extraction.  
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3.4 Potential petroleum reserves in the High North 
It has been estimated that a large share of the world’s remaining recoverable petroleum 
resources are located in the High North, but it is still unclear how large this share of resources 
is (NMFA 2009: 23). Covering only 6% of the Earth’s surface, the Arctic potentially holds as 
much as 22% of the world’s undiscovered oil and gas reserves (Budzik 2009). The United 
States Geological Survey (USGS), published in 2008, provided an assessment of 
undiscovered oil and gas resources in the High North, also known as the Circum-Arctic 
Resource Appraisal (CARA) (Baev 2017). However, without exploratory drilling, oil and gas 
resources cannot be proved to exist anywhere. Unfortunately, the USGS is not based on data 
from such exploratory drilling. It is rather an estimation of the probability of presence of oil 
and gas reserves in 33 provinces north of the Arctic Circle. Eight of these provinces were 
found to have less than a 10% probability of having at least one significant petroleum reserve. 
The remaining provinces were estimated to potentially hold 90 billion barrels worth of oil, 44 
billion barrels of natural gas liquids, as well as 1,669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. This 
estimate covers both onshore and offshore provinces. The USGS is widely cited as a 
legitimate starting point in academic and political discussions concerning Arctic petroleum 
exploration, without considering its potential limitations and this is problematic. As an 
example, the USGS estimates are based on general seismic surveys of the region, far from the 
industrial seismic surveys undertaken in specific areas before exploratory drilling takes place 
(Baev 2017; Tamnes and Offerdal 2016: 100-1).  
 
Nevertheless, the USGS is the best assessment we have of potential petroleum reserves in the 
High North to date. According to this assessment, Russia has the largest estimated oil and gas 
potential in the Arctic, making for 52% of the total, equivalent to 216 billion barrels of oil 
(Borgerson 2008: 67-68; Keil 2014: 168). Norway has the third biggest potential for Arctic oil 
and gas resources in its areas of jurisdiction, lagging behind Russia and the USA. Just like 
Russia, Norway is highly dependent on its petroleum industry, which totalled 21% of its gross 
domestic product (GDP) in 2010. It is also hard to ignore the fact that petroleum is Norway’s 
largest industry, whether measured in revenue, value creation or export value to the 
Norwegian state. The potential of the High North as a future petroleum province is even more 
interesting given that the NPD estimates that around 43% of Norwegian petroleum resources 
have already been extracted (NMPE 2010; 2011: 28; 2017). Therefore, to make up for 
depleting reserves, Norway is heavily invested in mapping out potential petroleum provinces 
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and granting exploration licenses, which amounted to 51 new blocks in the Barents Sea in 
2011 (NMPE). Luckily for Norway, High North waters under Norwegian jurisdiction are 
expected to bear fruit in the future (Keil 2014: 175-6). It is also estimated that petroleum 
reserves in the Russian Arctic could equal up to 113 billion tons (Nordquist, Moore and 
Skaridov 2005: 94). 
 
The prospects for significant petroleum deposits in the High North are, without a doubt, a 
factor which has had an impact on Russian and Norwegian attitudes and their willingness to 
make concessions in their boundary negotiations concerning the region. This is as the settled 
boundary determines the extent of the petroleum reserves allotted to each country. As Norway 
and Russia have not been able to agree on any joint utilisation of the area, the current 
knowledge of the resource potential here is quite poor. Seismology collected from both states 
has nevertheless indicated significantly large gas potential in the southern part. This declared 
knowledge of large deposits therefore makes it difficult to allow for concessions (Kvalvik 
2004: 60). To illustrate, figures 3 and 4 below clarify the regional distribution of 
undiscovered Arctic oil and natural gas resources respectively. 
 
 
Figure 3. Regional Distribution of Arctic Undiscovered Oil Resources (Lindholdt and 





Figure 4. Regional Distribution of Arctic Undiscovered Natural Gas Resources (ibid).  
 
3.5 The issue of climate change 
The ‘Arctic Climate Impact Assessment’ was recently compiled by over 200 scientists. It 
concludes that “the Arctic is likely to experience more rapid and severe climate change than 
any other region on Earth” (Orheim 2006: 36). In fact, the Arctic region is predicted to warm 
at twice the rate of the global average, which will dramatically alter access to this region. 
Paradoxically, however, more is currently known about the surface of the planet Mars than 
what is known about the depths of the Arctic Ocean, but it does have the possibility to hold 
relatively large undiscovered petroleum reserves (Borgerson 2008: 67).  
  
With the prospect of only a small part of the Arctic Ocean having sea ice cover by the second 
half of this century, new shipping routes are to be expected (Anderson 2009). This is a 
particularly viable alternative given that the distance to Rotterdam over the Arctic Ocean is 
half the distance through the Suez Canal, making the Arctic Ocean the main gateway between 
North America, Europe and Asia during the summer months. Furthermore, when 
contemplating petroleum activities, it is widely regarded that the largest environmental hazard 
stems from transport of oil in tankers, and not exploration or exploitation. By all means, the 
climate is adversely impacted by the burning and use of fossil fuels, but this is a general 
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problem which will not be solved by simply stopping petroleum exploration and extraction in 
a particular area (Orheim 2006: 36).  
 
Looking at Arctic geopolitics through the lens of neorealist interpretations of climate change 
and increasing competition for resources, two distinct narratives appear. The first deals with 
Arctic space as open and indeterminate in nature. This perceived openness of the Arctic 
enables it to become a space for conflict and conquest, mirrored by accounts of a so-called 
race to, or scramble for, the Arctic more commonly advocated during the first decade of the 
2000s (Moe, Fjærtoft and Øverland 2011: 158; Rottem 2010). However, this narrative also 
nourishes the idea of Arctic space becoming an arena for state-building and international 
relations, an argument more commonly put forward today (Dittmer et al. 2011: 202).  
 
Paradoxically, two of today’s main energy trends are toward an increase in unconventional 
petroleum production, and also toward a stricter global climate policy. The former helps to 
prolong the dominance of petroleum resources, while the other hopes to cut greenhouse gas 
emissions globally as quickly as possible. The current global energy market and legislation is 
thus rife with tensions, making the future unpredictable (Øverland 2015). As an example, the 
Paris Agreement can be viewed as a global economic trend that will eventually generate risks 
and hardship for Russia’s economy. A failure to realise the urgent need for action concerning 
climate change, might send Russia into a deep crisis because a global decrease in oil demand 
could slash Russian revenues while the costs necessitated by extreme weather could increase 
significantly (Kokorin and Korppoo 2017: 12). To illustrate the Russian difficulty in dealing 
with these environmental changes, an opinion poll conducted in July 2017 indicated that 70% 
of Russian citizens associate severe weather alterations with climate change, but only 55% 
acknowledge the anthropogenic origins of climate change. Furthermore, 35% of the public 
attributed changes to natural variations (ibid, 2).  
 
 
3.6 Russia’s High North strategy 
The uncertainty surrounding Russia’s domestic, foreign, and security policies, and their 
impact on the Arctic, is a recurring theme in circumpolar studies. This is even more of a 
critical question when considering Russian sanctions, the annexation of Crimea and the 
situation in Ukraine (Zysk and Titley 2015: 176). So, what is actually Russia’s formal policy 
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in relation to its petroleum resources in the High North? It is important to remember, first and 
foremost, that Russian Arctic policy is a coherent part of overall Russian foreign policy, and 
will therefore include similar, if not identical interests (Piskunova 2010: 852). The main 
official Russian strategy document on the Arctic, “Principals of state policy of the Russian 
Federation in the Arctic to 2020 and beyond”, may answer this question (Staun 2017: 319). 
 
One of the main aims of this strategy is economic development and a transformation of the 
High North into Russia’s greatest strategic base for natural resources by 2020 (Zysk and 
Titley 2015: 170). What first strikes the reader is how similar this document’s language is to 
Western policy documents concerning the Arctic. Natural resources are introduced as early as 
in paragraph 4.a as Russian “national interests”. In the following paragraph, 4.b, the second 
national interest is listed as “the preservation of the Arctic as a zone of peace and 
cooperation” (Øverland 2010: 867). Other Russian interests include the protection of 
ecological systems and the promotion of the northern sea route as an international waterway 
(paragraphs 4.c and 4.d respectively). In this respect, Russia’s main Arctic policy paper 
clearly emphasizes the need for international cooperation and other politically correct 
objectives, as it later mentions setting up a regional system of search and rescue as well as 
improving the lives of indigenous populations (paragraphs 7.b and 7.h respectively). 
Interestingly, the document also highlights the need to remove anthropogenic pollution from 
the Arctic (paragraph 8.e). Thus, many of the same concerns for soft values, cooperation, and 
the environment, like in Western Arctic policy documents, are expressed and given high 
priority in this Russian High North strategy. Although this document does include references 
to military security, these are by no means dominant. Rather, these references represent a 
small part of the various policy proposals highlighted in the paper (ibid, 866-868).  
 
On the 2nd of August 2007, Russia planted a titanium flag on the Arctic seabed at the point 
assumed to be the location of the North pole. This act was interpreted by international media 
as an effective public relations gesture for two reasons. Firstly, this scientific and 
technological exploit, which entailed descending 4200 metres beneath the ice cap 
demonstrated Russia's significance in the scientific world. Secondly, by performing this act, 
Russia reminded the world that it is still a great power that intends to defend its claims in the 
Arctic and to have those rights recognised internationally (Bartenstein 2009: 187; Dittmer et 
al. 2011). Though the reasoning behind this so-called stunt is still not entirely known, what is 
clear, however, is that Russia cannot be ignored in the High North and must be considered 
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whenever thinking about policy in this region. While Russia’s influence has definitely been 
reduced compared to the time of the SU, its status as the largest Arctic state still means that it 
is highly influential in the region (Rowe 2014: 76). Russia has the greatest landmass, 
population and resources in this area as well as substantial and growing military forces. 
Although Russia has attempted to keep its own foreign policy and regional issues out of the 
equation, the perception of Russia as a reliable partner has unquestionably been undermined. 
Russia’s tendency to put its respect for international law and cooperation aside when its 
national interests are at stake, could have a potentially catastrophic impact on Arctic relations. 
This is especially worrying given how heavily dependent Arctic affairs are on the respect for 
international law (Zysk and Titley 2015: 178). However, it would be wrong to judge Russia’s 
behavior in the Arctic solely upon its record of disagreement with the West in other areas. On 
the contrary, Russia has continuously proved its commitment to international law in the High 
North by demonstrating that it is a committed, rule-abiding actor here (Roberts 2015: 116).  
 
 
3.7 Russia’s relationship with the West 
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the relationship between Russia and the West has been 
viewed as a dichotomy of cooperation and conflict. The disintegration of the SU was not only 
one of the most significant events of the last century, but it was also accompanied by a 
reversal of the ancient Russian tradition of gathering territory and the state was left without an 
ideology and with an economy in turmoil (Sakwa 1996: 374). While Russia and the EU have 
often emphasised that they share the same values and interests, these players have also 
pursued their own interests alone, sometimes resulting in conflict. The petroleum sector and 
the economic sector are most often associated with cooperation between these two players, as 
EU member states and Russia have been able to strike mutually beneficial agreements within 
these issue areas (Hønneland 2013: 79-80). 
 
The onset of the Ukraine crisis, however, caused relations between Russia and the EU to 
freeze. Russia was left feeling alienated by the way the West had handled the end of the Cold 
War, for instance labelling it a victory. The Kremlin hoped that the collapse of the SU would 
help the West bring about a pluralistic world order, such as that envisioned in Gorbachev’s 
‘European home’ project, with the help of Russia (ibid). Instead, according to Russia, the 
1990s and 2000s saw the EU work towards expansion. In response, Russia attempted to 
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counter this EU-centric focus on its values, rules and regulations by establishing initiatives 
such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Eurasian Economic Union. While 
being mostly reactive, these initiatives and others served to counter the EU’s worldview and 
expansion into former Soviet territory (Nitoiu 2017: 148-150).  
 
Historically speaking, the Russian international position has emerged as largely dependent on 
the power and recognition of the West. The process of defining Russian national identity post-
SU has yet to come to an end due to the lack of long-term visions and strategies. Russian 
foreign policy has therefore been reactive in nature, in that it responds to the policies of the 
West rather than setting its own foreign policy agenda. On the one hand, Russia wants to be a 
great power able to survive in an unfriendly, realist world. On the other hand, this great power 
objective reflects Russia’s self-perception and its history of being the great power that was the 
Russian empire or the Soviet superpower. This dualism, the desire to strengthen power 
capabilities vis-à-vis the West while seeking its help and recognition, create preconditions for 
cooperation with the West as well as potential for non-cooperation and even conflict 
(Kropatcheva 2012: 31).  
 
In its foreign policy concepts Russia proclaims cooperation, but also uses warnings to the 
West to try to influence its actions. Throughout the 1990s, Russia sought inclusion and 
acceptance of Western countries. During this time, the West missed a unique opportunity to 
engage Russia more in political and economic Western institutions and to contribute to the 
creation of a new multilateral order. Instead, the West chose to interfere in the internal affairs 
of Russia while it was in a deep internal crisis and rushed to make use of its foreign policy 
and military weaknesses to claim as many advantages as possible before Russia eventually 
started to reassert its national interests. These circumstantial changes were overlooked in the 
West, and only after a military conflict in Georgia did the West understand that Moscow was 
serious and ready to fight back (ibid, 31-35).  
 
Before the Ukraine crisis, the EU was convinced that its integration project was purely 
economic in nature and did not a have geopolitical component intended to alter the status quo. 
Furthermore, the EU was positive that Russia was largely interested in upholding the security 
aspects of the region. The Ukraine crisis, however, made EU officials realise that Russia sees 
any external influence in the former territory of the SU as a threat, and will react accordingly. 
Until the start of the Ukraine crisis, then, the political elite in Moscow had looked at the EU 
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as an indecisive actor that would not challenge its economic cooperation with Russia. 
Interestingly, this dichotomy between conflict and cooperation has been most evident in terms 
of Russia’s petroleum relations with the West. While EU member states like Italy, France and 
Germany entered into economically beneficial partnerships with Russia, the Kremlin often put 
political pressure on post-Soviet countries by cutting off gas supplies from its pipelines. 
Although the EU implemented sanctions in the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis and began 
diversifying its energy supplies, the majority of energy deals struck before the crisis with Italy 
and Germany still remain intact. Overall, however, the EU’s contrasting approaches to 
cooperating with Russia on petroleum has served to undermine its common approach and 
fuelled the dichotomy between conflict and cooperation (Godzimirski 2011; Monaghan 2007; 
Nitoiu 2017: 151-159).  
 
Different views exist on the reasons for Russia’s unpredictability and non-cooperative nature 
towards the West, and how to analyse it. However, although Russia is often viewed as being 
non-cooperative and anti-Western, Russian foreign policy is rather selective and includes both 
cooperative and non-cooperative elements. Neoclassical realism presents Russia as a role-
player acting on behalf of its self-perception and identity. One of realism’s main assumptions 
is that states aim to provide security, influence and sovereignty. Realists therefore maintain 
that while the main interests of states remain largely permanent, policy preferences may 
change if circumstances change. Such changes in context include changes in the international 
power distribution and in domestic capabilities. Additionally, states will be more inclined to 
cooperate if their concerns for international prestige and status are considered by other states. 
Thus, a state’s behavior does not have to be either cooperative or non-cooperative, but rather 
adapts to changing circumstances. As a result, neoclassical realism posits that states may view 
each other simultaneously as security threats and valuable economic partners. In other words, 
a state may act conflictual in one policy area, and cooperative in another. In this way, states 
aim to keep open as many interaction opportunities as possible (Kropatcheva 2012: 30-32). 
As stated above, this dichotomy can be viewed in Russian-EU petroleum relations as well as 
in Russian-Norwegian petroleum relations. While Russia acts uncooperatively in its former 
sphere of influence, such as in Crimea and Ukraine, it wants to cooperate on wider petroleum 
issues, particularly in the Arctic.  
 
Russia’s actions in the Arctic may appear aggressive to some extent because they took place 
alongside a general worsening of Russian relations with the West. Such an interpretation of 
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Russia’s objectives is, however, incorrect. Russia’s Arctic strategy is rather based on the 
upholding of international law and agreements with other states. Russia’s efforts to resolve 
territorial disputes with Norway are a testament to this. Russian officials have also 
categorically dismissed the possibility for conflict in the Arctic, as they do not view this 
region as a potential war zone (Trenin and Baev 2010: 8-9). Thus, although Russian actions in 
Ukraine have been met with condemnation from the Western world and have made many 
states uneasy, it would be inappropriate to equate these actions with its interests in the Arctic. 
Instead, Russia is vocal about being a strong supporter of UNCLOS and emphasises the need 
for both bi- and multilateral cooperation to resolve any disputes in the region. In itself, the 
implementation and acceptance of UNCLOS as an overarching framework for Arctic 
cooperation is important as it profoundly alters the exclusive nature of territorial sovereignty. 
This is because it denies several spheres of overlapping rights, political authority and 
responsibilities (Carlson 2013: 23; Jørgensen 2010; Wilder 2010). In this sense, it would even 
be appropriate to label Russia as more of a ‘team player’ in the Arctic than the United States 
(Roberts 2015: 112). These properties of Russian behavior in the Arctic underline that Russia 
is willing to act cooperatively in this region, all the while breaking international law in other 
areas. However, the extent of mutual interests between Norway and Russia in the High North 
has not be sufficiently evaluated. This will be the purpose of the next chapter, which will 
evaluate the hypothesis claiming that Norwegian-Russian petroleum relations in the High 
















4 H1: Mutual interests in the region 
 
This chapter will discuss the hypothesis stating that Norwegian-Russian petroleum relations 
in the High North have remained cooperative because of mutual interests in the region. First, 
mutual interests between these two states will be evaluated. Then, potential conflicts of 
interest between Norway and Russia will be highlighted. The chapter will end with an 
analysis of how game theory fits with this hypothesis.  
 
 
4.1 Norwegian and Russian interests in the High North 
 
In “Perspectives on current and future challenges in the High North”, the former Norwegian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jonas Gahr Støre, notes that the High North was a frozen region 
during the Cold War (Gottemoeller and Tamnes 2009: 11). While it is still pretty cold, it is 
becoming a lot warmer in a physical sense, all the while opening up to more human activity 
(ibid; Jensen 2012). Similarly, Mikhail Gorbachev, speaking in Murmansk at the presentation 
of the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star Medal to the City of Murmansk in October 1987, 
emphasized that the Arctic is not only the Arctic Ocean, but where the interests of states 
belonging to mutually opposed military blocs cross. He hoped for the Arctic and the North 
Pole to become zones of peace, and for talks to start on the scaling down of military activities 
here (Miller in Utriainen et al. 1990: 9; Schönfeldt 2017: 184-185). Thus far, the Russian 
strategy in the Arctic has been dictated by two dominant international relations (IR) 
discourses, which serve to highlight its foreign policy direction (Staun 2015: 4).  
 
On the one hand, Russian foreign policy priorities are influenced by an IR-realism discourse 
that puts security first and values patriotism, consumed with exploring or conquering the High 
North and building up military power to further Russia’s national interests in the region. On 
the other hand, Russia’s foreign policy direction is also inspired by IR-liberalism, which puts 
an emphasis on cooperation and values a respect for international law and cooperation, 
labelling the High North as a ‘territory of dialogue’ (ibid). This narrative argues that Arctic 
states will collectively benefit the most if they aspire to cooperate peacefully. While the 
visible and memorable media stunt of 2007, when a Russian submarine planted a Russian flag 
on the Arctic seabed claiming it to be Russian territory, and its immediate aftermath, may be 
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said to expose Russia’s IR-realism, IR-liberalism has since 2008-2009 dominated Russian 
policy in the High North (Dodds 2010; Janjgava 2012). This change in policy can be said to 
have been heavily influenced by the Kremlin’s decision to leave Arctic relations to the 
Foreign Ministry and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov (Staun 2017: 314).  
 
While the Norwegian-Russian relationship will never be completely independent of the wider 
Russian-Western relationship, it is neither completely reliant on it. If conflicts were to occur, 
it is likely that states other than Norway would be at the forefront of Western disputes with 
Russia. Also, there are clearly mutual interests between Norway and Russia in this region, 
regardless of their asymmetries. The two countries share the Barents Sea, they are both 
interested in petroleum exploration and development in these waters, and desire to engage in 
sustainable resource management. Although the degree of cooperation between these two 
states depend heavily on the willingness to cooperate with one another, on both sides, other 
contextual factors also play a significant part. While few expect Russia’s relationship with 
Norway to be of the more troublesome kind, there is a considerable range within which it can 
fluctuate. However, parallel to Russian–Western relations souring, Norwegian foreign policy 
towards Russia has experienced a de facto re-centralization. A vital question for the future is 
thus whether Norway will continue its aspiration to be a leading Arctic player focusing on 
petroleum development, all the while maintaining its relationship with Russia, or whether an 
emphasis on climate change under a future Norwegian government will change Norway’s 
strategic priorities, and therefore the view to Russia (Bourmistrov et al. 2015: 20).  
 
4.2 Mutual interests from a game theoretical perspective 
 
Having laid out these properties and narratives surrounding Norwegian and Russian interests 
in the Arctic, the game theoretical literature now needs to be consulted.  
 
The need to employ sequential game reasoning 
 
States involved in disputes of any kind, such as the delimitation disputes between Norway and 
Russia in the High North, do not necessarily act simultaneously and without knowing the 
history of play, like in the case of the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma game. More frequently, one 
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state moves first and the other reacts, knowing exactly what the other state has done. Simple 
matrix games, like the Prisoner’s Dilemma game or the Chicken game, however, do not take 
into account sequence. In sequence games, the Stackelberg equilibrium refers to the leader-
follower aspects of perfect information rather than simultaneous-move games and specifies 
the meaning of first-mover advantage (Gates and Humes 1997: 95-99).  
 
So, when do sequential moves really make a difference? The answer is when an imperfect 
information game has a mixed strategy equilibrium, like in a game of Chicken. In such a 
game, and under simultaneous-choice conditions, players will alter their moves between 
cooperation and defection according to expected payoffs. In the sequential form, however, no 
such alterations will take place. Sequential choice ensures that mutual defection is avoided. 
However, it also means that player two will always be in a disadvantageous position (ibid, 
101). First-mover advantage is a well-known feature of sequential move games, as the player 
moving first gets to choose the direction the game will take and has the opportunity to 
surprise his opponent. First-mover advantage tends to arise when it is important for players to 
be able to commit themselves to a particular course of action in order to deter the other player 
from behaving in a certain way in a particular game. 
 
However, second-mover advantages do exist and include the knowledge of what move the 
other player has made in the current round and all previous rounds. Second-mover advantage 
is therefore more important when there is a premium on being able to make flexible responses 
to the moves made by the other player. Such knowledge makes it easier to pinpoint the right 
conditional strategy to employ for future plays (Romp 1997: 36). Thankfully, players in game 
theoretical scenarios can move away from their self-interested nature to behave reciprocally. 
Reciprocity entails that players, in response to friendly moves from their opponent, act more 
cooperatively than envisioned by traditional, self-interest predictions (Fehr and Gächter 2000: 
159-160). In this sense, the continuity of relationships can help generate behavior that would 
otherwise be viewed as altruistic (Granovetter 1985: 492). These properties of game theory 




According to realism, although states have many different goals, their main goal is survival. 
This primary goal makes states incredibly aware of any threat to their ability to protect their 
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independence and security. Accordingly, realism supposes that a major goal of any state is to 
halt the rise in the relative power of other states. In this sense, states may even sacrifice 
opportunities to increase their own power to ensure a more level distribution of power 
worldwide (Grieco 1988b: 602). Similarly, the central question for the work on anarchy is 
how cooperation is possible when players, such as Russia and Norway, find themselves in a 
Prisoner’s Dilemma. This is any situation in which players have a certain preference ordering. 
This preference ordering starts at exploiting the other, then mutual cooperation, then mutual 
defection, and ends at being exploited oneself. As a result, two key questions need to be 
addressed in terms of these preferences and how they come about. Firstly, how do we know 
what the preferences of players are? Secondly, how are these preferences established? The 
first question is the most obvious one, as it addresses the issue of how it is possible to know 
that a situation resembles a PD (Jervis 1988: 322).  
 
Additionally, a state will worry about relative gains advantaging a partner in one situation as 
this could lead to a shift in bargaining power favouring the partner. This may subsequently 
lead the partner to renegotiate and better its terms of agreement in the situation at hand, as 
well as in other common ventures. From this line of argument develops the realist notion of 
the relative-gains problem. This problem specifies that a state will join, leave or limit its 
commitment to any cooperative agreement if it suspects that a partner is achieving, or will 
likely achieve disproportionate gains because of their common venture. The issue here is that 
conventional forms of the PD game do not take into account the relative-gains problem. The 
assumption must therefore be that players achieve similar payoffs or believe they do so, 
regardless of whether the outcome of the game is mutual cooperation or mutual defection. 
However, the completely opposite assumption could also be true, as players believe both of 
these outcomes to be highly unequal. Such a view of the PD game by players may be because 
players do not know, or do not scrutinise, the magnitude of the other player’s payoffs or 
interval ranges. In general, from a realist point of view, a state may be highly dissatisfied if its 
partner’s payoff from a game, or payoff-range, outstrips its own (Grieco 1988b: 603).  
 
If states care mainly about maximising their power advantage and not their absolute gains and 
losses, many of the strategies that should, in theory, facilitate cooperation in a PD game no 
longer play out in a cooperative manner. Thus, Axelrod points toward the irony that the 
strategy of reciprocity, also known as tit-for-tat, that has proven so successful in computer 
simulations of PD games, cannot triumph in any individual game. Instead, this strategy works 
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well because it collects many points when matched against fellow cooperators and is not 
highly exploited when met with more competitive strategies. However, if the main rewards in 
international politics are concerned with relative gains, a strategy that can produce a tie, at 
best, will not be deemed attractive by any state operating under realist assumptions. This 
concern is likely to be greater in matters relating to security than to economic concerns, but is 
also present in the latter, particularly because military and economic matters are tightly 
connected (Jervis 1988: 334-335).  
 
Preferences may also change through the process of the interaction itself. If two states are 
hostile, one state will probably suspect that anything the other state pushes is bad. Therefore, 
an outcome that was formerly supported will be looked at with scepticism if the other state 
favours it. Correspondingly, if a state takes a strong interest in an issue, this can lead the other 
state to formulate a completely different preference. The conflict process therefore produces 
interests and preferences rather than being generated by them (ibid, 327). However, when 
realist Stephan Krasner states that much of international politics lies on the Pareto frontier, he 
claims that states already have the necessary means to cooperate to such an extent that no 
further moves can make them all better off without making anyone worse off. In this respect, 
offensive realists see important situations in international politics as PD games. In such 
situations, one or more states are prepared to risk war in order to conquer territory, or have 
security goals that completely contradict with that of other states. According to this line of 
reasoning, endorsed by John Mearsheimer, states maximise their own power in order to make 
sure they are safe or because they want something that they believe power will bring them 
(Jervis 1999: 47-48).  
 
The disadvantages of employing the Prisoner’s Dilemma game 
In this regard, it must be stated that conventional forms of PD games do not model the 
relative-gains element of state preferences because they do not employ the realist definition of 
state utility. From a realist point of view, states are positional and assess all international 
relationships, including those based on mutual interests, in terms of their impact on defensive 
power capabilities. Contrastingly, PD analyses assume that states are atomistic and act as 
‘rational egoists’ (Keohane 2005) solely on the basis of calculations of individual absolute 
gains. It is this assumption of state atomism that prevents conventional PD games from 
sharing realism's understanding of the relative-gains element of state preferences or its 
 
 46 
inhibitory effects on the willingness of states to cooperate. PD games would shed light on the 
process of international collaboration more powerfully if they could more explicitly model 
state positionality, as well as the resulting structure of state preferences, such as the “desire 
for larger over smaller absolute gains and for smaller over larger gaps in gains favouring 
partners” (Grieco 1988b: 606). In order to be able to model such a structure of state 
preferences, PD games would have to be redesigned so that states would know their own 
payoffs and those of their partners, and consequently would be able to compare the magnitude 
of their own payoffs with the payoffs of their partners (ibid). The particular difficulty 
confronted by game theorists at this stage is that any player’s optimal or utility-maximising 
choice is oftentimes dependent on how the other player moves. However, the normal form of 
a PD game highlights the nature of this complex decision problem, as both players choose 
strategies simultaneously and therefore cannot observe what the other player does. 
Subsequently, players may observe choice alternatives as the extensive form game unfolds, 
but their initial choice of a strategy has already determined their conditional responses. How, 
then, do players ultimately choose their strategy in an environment of mutual dependency? 
This is the central problem of game theory (Ordeshook 1986: 114-115).  
 
It is necessary at this point to stress that non-cooperative game theory does not imply that 
players will never work together. It does imply, nevertheless, that this will only occur if 
players view cooperation to be in their own self-interest. Thus, players will only cooperative 
if they voluntarily choose to do so, and not because they have to (Romp 1997: 2). In other 
words, the fact that cooperation can be supported in equilibrium does not equate that states 
will cooperate (Bó and Fréchette 2018: 71). Such an individualistic approach to game theory 
is consistent with neoclassical economics. Players are also assumed to be instrumentally 
rational, and therefore expected to act according to their own self-interest, as mentioned in 
chapter 2. However, given the complex nature of many decisions and the information 
overload associated with them, this assumption seems unrealistic. Further, experimental 
evidence demonstrates that players, instead of acting completely rationally, adopt simple, 
suboptimal rules when making decisions. Nevertheless, the justification given for this 
rationality assumption is that it seeks to show how rational players would solve complex 
decisions if they were indeed fully rational (Romp 1997: 2-3). 
 
Defensive realists take a position on the role of unnecessary conflict that has more in common 
with neoliberals. Scholars such as Glaser and Jervis see the Prisoner's Dilemma as capturing 
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important dynamics of international politics, especially through the operation of the security 
dilemma. This dilemma highlights ways in which the attempt by one state to increase its 
security has the unintended consequence of decreasing the security of others. States in the 
international system will often be willing to settle for the status quo and are likely driven 
more by fear of others than by the desire to make gains for themselves. According to this 
model of international politics, both perceptual and structural reasons coincide to make the 
actions states take to protect themselves self-defeating. In many cases, it is the negotiating 
process among states that itself generates conflict rather than expose or enact pre-existing 
differences in objectives. In most circumstances, both states would, in fact, be satisfied with 
mutual security. This is as international politics represents tragedy rather than evil as the 
actions of states make it even harder for them to feel safe (Jervis 1999: 49). Defensive realists 
thus regard the properties of the situation and the other state’s objectives as critical. This helps 
to explain why scholars of this kind come up with differing policy recommendations if they 
have contrasting views of the other state (ibid, 52).  
 
To attempt to solve this tendency to defect, leadership situations in what would otherwise be 
known as Prisoner’s Dilemma games are common within international relations. The role of 
leader often falls to the most well-established or largest of the players, in this case Russia. In 
such circumstances, the largest player may accept the leadership role since its own interests 
are closely tied with the other player. Further, if the largest player constitutes a substantial 
fraction of the issue or region, such a convergence of interests would seem obvious. In such a 
scenario, the largest player would be expected to behave more cooperatively than might 
otherwise be the case (Dixit, Skeath and Reiley 2015: 394). This logic works for Norwegian-
Russian petroleum relations in the High North and demonstrates how game theoretical 
modelling may be employed to analyse this case.  
 
The extent of mutual interests between Norway and Russia 
 
One of the fundamental goals of any game theoretical analysis is to predict and explain the 
outcome of social interactions, whether between individuals or larger entities like states. 
These players may have partly or completely different interests. Non-cooperative games are 
therefore characterised as those where opposite interests exist, as well as mixed interest games 
where agreements are not enforceable (Harsanyi 1962b: 141-143). In most applications of 
game theory, the players are motivated exclusively by self-interest. However, such a 
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prerequisite is not necessary for the use of game theory to be helpful. Rather, there is evidence 
that many other types of motivation are present within bilateral relations, such as those 
between Norway and Russia in the High North (Hovi and Rasch 1993: 25).  
 
If the horizon of a game is indeterminate, this could mean one of two things. The first is that 
both states know that the game will be repeated infinitely. The second is that states know that 
the number of repetitions has an upward limit. However, none of the states know when the 
game will actually end. In both scenarios where the length of the game is unknown, there is 
still a probability that the game will continue for at least one more round, after the current 
play. This applies regardless of how many rounds have already been played. Such uncertainty 
ensures that the backwards induction argument no longer applies, since both states risk that a 
violation on their part may be punished in the future. As a result, it is no longer rational for 
the states to defect. It may now, however, be rational for the states to comply at all stages of 
the game (Hovi 1998: 93).  
 
Axelrod’s conflict of interest insights  
 
Axelrod (1970) differentiates between two kinds of conflict or conflictful behavior. The first 
includes instances such as strikes and wars, while the other is known as conflicts of 
preferences, which he calls conflicts of interest (Nagel 1975: 154). The term conflict, used 
interchangeably with conflict of interest by Axelrod, “is a property of the preferences of the 
participants and the structure of the situation in which they find themselves” (1967: 87). What 
is tested in this respect is how a state’s behavior changes in situations with different amounts 
of conflict of interest. When imagining conflicts of interest, two extremes can be envisioned: 
the first is a total conflict of interest and the second is no conflict of interest. The degree of 
conflict in any strategic interaction may be employed to predict the behavior of the states in 
the game. In this sense, a conflict of interest may be defined as the incompatibility of 
objectives between two states. As such, any conflict of interest is a combination of the 
preferences of states and the circumstances in which they find themselves (Axelrod 1970: 5). 
These two opposing positions of either a maximum or a minimum conflict of interest, 




Figure 5. Maximum Conflict of Interest (ibid, 83). 
 
Figure 6. Minimum Conflict of Interest (ibid, 84). 
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As illustrated in the two figures above, one point is enough to set an upper bound and a lower 
bound on the amount of conflict of interest in a given bargaining game. If the Russians would 
have to be at least 60% sure of getting their draft before preferring not to settle for the 
compromise and the Norwegians would have to be 70% sure of getting their draft through 
before preferring not to settle for the compromise, then D = (.6, .7). As the region of feasible 
outcomes is thought to be convex, regardless of which other compromises are possible, the 
maximum conflict of interest would be .35. This happens when each state is actually 
indifferent between settling for the other’s draft treaty and having no agreement, making the 
minimum conflict of interest possible equal to .24. Therefore, the onlooker knows that the 
conflict of interest is between ¼ and 1/3 (ibid, 83). In less formal and mathematical terms, the 
more the region of feasible outcomes bulges, the less conflict there is to be perceived. The 
correct measure of conflict of interest in bargaining games can therefore be simply put. The 
more the region illustrated in the figures above bulges outwards, or the greater the area to the 
right of point D, the less compatible the objectives of the states in the game are (Axelrod 
1967: 92).  
 
In the main official Russian strategy document on the Arctic, “Principals of state policy of the 
Russian Federation in the Arctic to 2020 and beyond” (Staun 2017: 319) natural resources are 
introduced as early as in paragraph 4.a as Russian “national interests” (Øverland 2010: 867). 
Given the emphasis Norway also puts on the High North potentially becoming a future 
petroleum province in its High North strategy, these two states can be said to have significant 
mutual interests in this region. In this respect, Schelling’s discoveries relating to scenarios 
where a mixture of conflict and common interest preside in game theory, can also be applied 
to a situation where interests are largely aligned by way of tacit coordination. This can be said 
to be the case when it comes to Norwegian-Russian relations in the High North as these states 
have significant mutual interests. As such, pure coordination is a game of strategy equivalent 
to a strategy of conflict. Imagine a game in which each state’s best choice depends on the 
action he expects the other state to take, which he knows depends on what the other state’s 
expectation of his own move is. In such circumstances, states’ convergence of expectations is 
essential to create focal points that normally arise out of considerations that have their 
grounding outside the pure formalities of the game (Dixit 2006: 220-1).  
 
Game theory, therefore, provides a phenomenal framework for discussing the issue of conflict 
in social science situations. The description, provided by game theory, of a two-state 
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interaction, highlights the full set of available strategies and the associated payoffs for each 
state regardless of how the game of play unfolds. In a zero-sum game, for instance, there is a 
total incompatibility of goals. This is because there is no room for cooperation. The opposite 
extreme is where the interests of states fit together perfectly. In such a partnership situation 
the outcome most desired by one state is also the outcome most desired by the other state. 
However, neither of these extreme examples are very frequent in real life. Instead, most 
relevant problems in political science lie between these two extremes. In such mixed-motive 
games the states have an incentive both to compete and to cooperate with each other 
(Schelling 1960). Therefore, an important question to ask is whether the game between 
Norway and Russia in the High North is more like a zero-sum game or more like a 
partnership game. The problem is then to develop a measure of the amount of conflict in the 
game at hand. The cardinal index of utility, which assigns a number to the value each state 
attaches to each outcome, has been provided by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947). This 
theory of utility is always consistent with the assumption that a state will maximise the 
mathematical expectation of their utility (Bishop 1963: 560). Thus, if a state prefers A to B 
and B to C, then that same state will also always prefer A to C (Axelrod 1967: 88-89).  
 
The need for games to be played infinitely 
If a game is repeated indefinitely, cooperation may develop. The issue is then to find out 
which conditions are necessary and sufficient for this cooperation to emerge (Axelrod 2006: 
11). First and foremost, states need to have a range of mutual political interests, including 
military and economic interests. Second, the economic arrangements of the two states need to 
be ‘nested’ in larger political alliances for cooperation to succeed, as this promotes 
compliance. Both of these conditions should help combat realism and the relative-gains 
problem (Grieco 1988a: 504). Through rational learning by way of repeated games, states can 
learn to play the game, one move at a time. This happens because states start with hypotheses 
about which strategies the other state may employ and through playing repeated games update 
their strategy by observing the actions of the other state in the game (Morrow 1994: 305-306). 
When it comes to the Norwegian-Russian petroleum relationship in the High North, these 
properties can be said to be present, particularly given their commitment to the Arctic Council 
(AC) and international law concerned with the Arctic. While both these states certainly have 




Contrary to the classic battle of the sexes game, a two-player coordination game where a 
couple decide where to meet, many games do not have a cooperative outcome when played 
once, but rather have cooperative outcomes if repeated. If a game is repeated infinitely then 
for both states cooperating is an equilibrium, as repeated play can allow states to punish non-
cooperative behavior. It can be shown that, if the game is to be played infinitely, then the 
optimal strategy for both states is cooperation and this behavior will be an equilibrium. 
However, this is not the only equilibrium. Defecting forever is also in equilibrium (Morton 
1999: 188-189). Overall, when a game is repeated, the number of possible equilibrium 
outcomes will most likely increase drastically, but only if states in the game are sufficiently 
patient (Bó and Fréchette 2018: 68). This property of repeated games is often called the folk 
theorem as it has no particular author and is therefore considered part of game theory folklore 
(Morton 1999: 189).  
 
Keeping in mind these ideas from game theory, it is fairly clear that Norway and Russia have 
mutual interests in the High North. First and foremost, Norway shares a 196 km long border 
with Russia in the region and being neighbors in this sense has been a significant factor in 
post-Cold War relations. Since the turn of the century, Norway has had to adapt to new 
political reforms and a new political atmosphere on the Russian side, but these obstacles have 
largely been overcome and relations have therefore been strengthened by it (Hønneland and 
Rowe 2010a: 12-14). In fact, Russia is referred to as a cooperative partner in every chapter of 
Norway’s High North documents. Norway also emphasizes that it will engage in a 
“pragmatic, interest-based and cooperation-oriented” policy towards Russia (NMFA 2006: 
15). This is because the Norwegian government is aware that sustained Russian involvement 
is paramount for continued resource use and environmental management in the Barents Sea 
and the wider Arctic region (Rowe 2014: 76).  
 
It can be argued that Norway and Russia’s mutual interests in the High North are the same as 
the mutual interests between the West and Russia in this region. However, there are some 
important differences. Although the border between Norway and Russia has helped secure 
neighbourly relations between these two states, this has not been the case for instance 
between Russia and its neighbour Ukraine, particularly in recent years. A reason for this is 
that while Russia’s relationship with many of its former Soviet republics is troublesome and 
characterised by a Russian desire to still control these now independent states, such a 
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relationship has never existed between Norway and Russia. Thus, despite them being 
neighbours, Russia has never attempted to conquer Norway or drastically influence its 
policies, like it has with Ukraine, especially when a possible EU membership for Ukraine 
appeared to be on the cards.  
Furthermore, Russia is currently experiencing an excessive Western presence near its borders, 
as it aims to use its newly acquired wealth to regain its once great power status. This strategy 
should be considered one of soft-balancing. This assertiveness and Russia’s material 
capacities can be viewed as a strategic response to its oil and gas revenues (Piskunova 2010: 
852). This is what separates Russia’s relationship with the wider Western world and its 
relationship with Norway. Both states are dependent on each other’s petroleum resources and 
expertise in order to explore the reserves present in the High North. Norway knows that it is 
paramount for its potential future Arctic resource use that it can rely on Russian petroleum 
cooperation, and this is not only to secure friendly relations in the High North. Rather, 
Norway hopes to be able to exchange high-tech petroleum technology for accessing oil and 
gas fields on the Russian side. Russia, on the other hand, knows that it needs to be open to 
cooperate with Norway and Equinor, formerly Statoil, in order to extract the petroleum 
resources that can be found in its rich reserves in this region.  
 
In this sense, the Norwegian-Russian petroleum relationship in the High North differs from 
that between Russia and the wider West because of two main factors: Norway has historically 
been tolerant of the SU’s and Russia’s policies, which the EU and the wider West has often 
condemned and sanctioned them. Although Norway has been part of sanctioning efforts due 
to it being a member of NATO, it has not been the driver of such responses. Additionally, 
Norway can lend crucial technology and expertise to Russia so that its dream to exploit High 
North petroleum reserves may become a reality in the future. In order to facilitate this, Russia 
will have to exchange some of the resources found in its High North reserves in order for 
Norway to provide its sophisticated technology. All in all, both mutual interests and 
petroleum interdependence help explain why Norwegian-Russian petroleum relations in the 
High North have remained cooperative. However, when mentioning mutual interests, the 
issue of petroleum interdependence often crops up. The latter hypothesis and its potentially 




5 H2: Both states can benefit from the others’ petroleum resources 
and expertise 
 
This chapter will discuss the hypothesis stating that Norwegian-Russian petroleum relations 
in the High North have remained cooperative because both states can benefit from the others’ 
petroleum resources and expertise. The chapter will begin by evaluating the state of petroleum 
developments today. Russian dependence on Norwegian petroleum technology will then be 
discussed. Next, Norwegian dependence on Russian petroleum fields will be considered. The 




5.1 The state of petroleum developments today 
 
The price of oil is a key factor driving developments in the High North. When the price of oil 
is high and consistent, the region becomes more interesting as a potential site for exploration. 
When the price of oil is relatively low, on the other hand, and when the cost of exploiting and 
transporting Arctic oil remains relatively high, there is little incentive for share-holding 
companies to engage in risky exploration in this region. Correspondingly, access to resources 
and security of delivery are also important factors to consider. The concern regarding the 
former is political stability in the next 20-30 years, which is the typical length of an 
investment perspective for major developments (Orheim 2006: 32). As regards security, the 
Arctic is definitely more attractive than many Middle Eastern areas (Jakobsen and Melvin 
2016: 26-28; Kratochvil and Tichy 2013). So far, the Russian part of the Barents Sea, which 
encompasses Shtokmanovakoye, has been developed as an offshore gas field, and it is 30 
times greater than the Norwegian gas field Snøhvit. The latter, and smaller field, is estimated 
to have a gross value of $25 billion (Orheim 2006: 32).  
 
Petroleum resources is still a highly contentious topic, particularly when it comes to issues 
such as energy security and dependency (Jakobsen and Melvin 2016: 26-27; Maugeri 2003; 
Ziegler 2012). The latter issue is especially poignant in terms of the EU’s dependence on 
Russian gas (Angell, Eikeland, and Selle 2010: 326-327; Baev 2012: 179-180; Baran 2007; 
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Ermida 2015; Kratochvil and Tichy 2013; Orheim 2006; Hønneland and Rowe 2010b: 117, 
129; Roberts 2015). Norway became an oil nation in the early 1970s, while engagement 
towards the third world was also on the up. The thought of a Norwegian position as both a 
consumer and a producer, and in between poor and rich countries, resonated in Norwegian 
political circles at the time. The key ambition was to secure a stable and high oil price. This 
ambition could help to serve more than one purpose as it would contribute to securing 
stability and predictability in the world economy and would incentivise the development of 
alternative, renewable energy resources (Tamnes 1997: 424). 
 
In the 1980s, during the Cold War, the High North was a key strategic region for Norway. 
After the end of the Cold War, NATO’s objectives were altered, and the High North was 
given less priority in the face of new challenges. From a security perspective, Norway risked 
being marginalised. The change of power in the Kremlin in 1985 signalled the end of the SU 
and the Cold War. The new, charismatic Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev quickly gained 
traction in Norwegian politics. As time went on, Norway began to develop a two-sided 
strategy towards the new Russia. The new policy was built on two distinct pillars, namely 
deterrence and reassurance. On the one hand, Norwegian authorities attempted to use this 
change in power to further cooperation in the High North. This strategy was developed 
alongside the ambitious goals of 1992 regarding closer cooperation in the Barents region, 
which was a multilateral effort. The main goal was to promote growth and stability in the 
High North by incorporating Russia into an international cooperation network. Further, 
Norway was worried about security, particularly in relation to the potential for conflict over 
unresolved borders and extensive natural resources. One issue was that Russian authorities 
stuck by the traditional goal of Norwegian-Soviet shared ownership of the resources in the 
Barents Sea (ibid, 133-135).  
 
Throughout the 1990s, the development of Northwestern Russia contributed to the formation 
of a Norwegian High North policy. Threats of armed aggression were no longer at the top of 
the political agenda, but the region was considered an ever-increasing environmental threat in 
the form of nuclear waste and polluting industry on the Russian side. These perceptions have 
formed the basis for a general opinion among Norwegians of Russia as an “environmental 
laggard” (Jensen 2010: 296). Therefore, the petroleum for development discourse does not 
say that Norway should refrain from petroleum extraction in the Barents Sea to protect the 
environment, but rather get up and running quickly to help the Russians engage in petroleum 
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activities that are more environmentally friendly. An important premise of this argument is 
that the Russians will probably start extraction in the region soon, irrespective of Norwegian 
involvement (ibid, 295-8). 
 
Even if experts admit to the importance of the Arctic region for the petroleum sector, the 
profitability of Arctic exploration remains unclear. Indeed, according to several evaluations, 
exploration could be profitable only if high-technology machinery is used and if oil prices 
remain over $100-$120 a barrel, a level not seen since mid-2014. The Arctic project is 
therefore a very important political issue, but one that can easily become delayed (Piskunova 
2010: 857). Currently, apart from a few oil and gas extractions in the Norwegian Sea, Arctic 
Norway has hosted petroleum explorations for the most part, while production has occurred in 
the North Sea further south. Now that North Sea fields are gradually drying up, the prospect 
of finding new reserves further north is becoming a more promising and necessary endeavour 
(Glomsrød and Aslaksen 2009: 58).   
 
 
5.2 Russian dependence on Norwegian petroleum technology 
 
In “Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and National 
Security Protection for the Period up to 2020” from 2013, the current state of the Arctic 
Russian zone is characterized by several risks and threats (Schönfeldt 2017: 195-196). The 
first is a lack of Russian equipment and technologies for exploiting and developing offshore 
hydrocarbon fields. Another worry is high energy consumption coupled with low efficiency 
of natural resource extraction. Finally, the costs associated with production in this region and 
low productivity are considered threats (ibid). These Russian worries are also grounded in 
reality. Russia’s Northern Fleet has struggled to modernize since the 2008 financial crisis 
halted its ability to finance modernisation. Currently, Gazprom lacks the capacity and 
knowledge to master certain offshore technologies and will therefore require foreign partners 
in this process. The Russian port system is also in a poor state. All of these factors work to 
weaken Russia’s ability to project power in the Arctic region (Laruelle 2011: 83-84).  
 
Early in 2010, Shtokman Development AG (SDAG) decided to postpone the Shtokman 
project for three years. This was a natural decision given that the plan to bring to shore the 
 
 57 
first gas as early as in 2013 was now completely unrealistic. Future gas prices would also 
affect the development of the field. The Shtokman development would have been the largest 
industrial development in the High North to date, but the environmental and security 
challenges associated with the development would be immense. In 2006, Russia created a 
fund from its oil revenues, similar to the Norwegian oil fund. However, the financial crisis 
and the attempt to stabilise the Russian ruble have since drained most of it. Future oil and gas 
prices will therefore be very important to the Russian economy. This is because oil and gas 
are not simply revenue streams for Russia, but also important foreign policy tools for Russian 
authorities (Angell, Eikeland, and Selle 2010: 326-327). 
 
The Arctic is a key priority for Russia’s ambitious and authoritarian leadership, especially 
because of its particular appeal to the national Russian consciousness. President Vladimir 
Putin has personally committed to advancing Russia’s interests in the High North, and the 
potential for exploiting petroleum-rich reserves in this region is undoubtedly a key part of this 
commitment. Russia’s Arctic dreams, however, seem likely to eventually crash with the harsh 
reality of Russia’s stagnating economy. Arctic reserve estimates and the assessments of their 
accessibility are increasingly viewed as being seriously exaggerated. While several different 
figures are present in Russian debates on the development of the vast Arctic, the only 
relatively solid estimate remains the 2008 USGS resource estimation, which has already been 
overtaken by new discoveries, particularly of unconventional sources such as shale. Russian 
experts have had to admit that offshore fields, like the one discovered in September 2014 by 
Rosneft and ExxonMobil in the Kara Sea, would only be profitable with oil prices ranging 
from $70-$100 a barrel. This is a reality that seems relatively far-fetched these days although 
oil prices are currently on the up. Simultaneously, the Russian defence budget is experiencing 
more cuts, and the Arctic lobby is one of the losers in this bureaucratic tug-of-war. The key 
problem with Russia’s vision for the development of the Arctic is that political will wins over 
economic rationale, and as the former is volatile, the latter is starting to disappear. 
Furthermore, Western sanctions make offshore exploration close to impossible given the lack 
of modern technology, and funding from the Chinese is not currently a sufficient replacement. 
Meanwhile, Russia’s corruption and bureaucratic mismanagement interferes with plans to 
exploit resources onshore. Thus, there is a clear mismatch between promoting international 
cooperation, building up military capabilities, and exporting hydrocarbons all at the same 
time (Baev 2017).  
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The result is an Arctic strategy that is fundamentally unsustainable and incoherent, and this 
leaves Russia heavily disadvantaged (ibid). Accordingly, Russia is presently dependent on 
Norway for technologies needed to access natural resources that are difficult to get to. The 
Shtokman gas field, one of the richest in the world, exemplifies this dependency. While the 
American companies ConocoPhillips and Chevron, alongside British Petroleum, were very 
active during the submission process, they were suddenly pushed aside without much of an 
explanation (Hønneland and Rowe 2010b: 124-126). Then, Norwegian Statoil was awarded a 
25% share of the exploration, as it is the only company equipped with the necessary drilling 
and extraction technologies for exploration in such severe natural conditions. As a result, 
Norway has become a necessary partner. This is a prime example of Russia’s soft balancing 
strategy. By preserving the most precious source of its wealth, Russia is effectively protecting 
itself from the perceived American threat (Piskunova 2010: 860).  
 
Developing offshore Arctic petroleum reserves, as mentioned, require a significant amount of 
resources and advanced technology, something that Russian state-controlled giants Gazprom 
and Rosneft currently lack. Nonetheless, delimitation of the marine space and the seabed in 
the Barents Sea is a step in the right direction for Moscow’s intentions to start developing the 
resources under the Arctic seabed. As Kremlin politicians have uttered repeatedly, the 
transformation of the Arctic region into a resource base for the Russian economy is a strategic 
priority for the state. For instance, Russia’s biggest shipping company, Sovcomflot, has 
already announced a new strategic concept tied to offshore petroleum exploitation in the 
Arctic. The hope is that this strategy will result in a greater number of ships capable of 
carrying LNG resources and oil extracted offshore. In fact, Russia’s Arctic Strategy of 2013 
has scaled down on some of the overly optimistic deadlines present in the original strategy. 
This version is also more open to cooperate internationally in order to solve some of the key 
issues faced by Russia’s energy sector, namely the lack of technology, know-how and 
practical experience in exploiting petroleum fields in the Arctic. In fact, the document plainly 
states that Russia on its own neither has the resources nor the technology to exploit petroleum 
fields in offshore parts of the Arctic (Choi 2014: 70; Zysk and Titley 2015: 320).  
 
While Russia is unlikely to follow the example of the US regarding the Paris Agreement 
within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Putin does 
sympathise with President Trump’s worries. Russian authorities view the Paris Agreement as 
part of the global economic low-carbon trend, which endangers the national economy’s 
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revenues from the export of oil and gas. Furthermore, other global trends already affect 
Russia. The development of Arctic offshore petroleum resources has been faced with several 
obstacles. The development of the Shtokman gas field was cancelled because of cost issues, 
combined with falling prices in global markets. Later, falling oil prices meant questions were 
raised regarding the profitability of other Arctic offshore projects. In the short term, these 
have been delayed because of Western sanctions against Russia. Currently, only one offshore 
project is in operation, the Prirazlomnoye field in the Pechora Sea (Kokorin and Korppoo 
2017: 3-10). The Russian leadership is currently choosing to ignore signals about the gradual 
phase-out of oil, and rather depends on scenarios predicting that the fossil-fuel era will 
continue. The Paris Agreement is viewed as part of a global trend that will create massive 
uncertainty for Russia’s economy, but only sometime in the distant future. A failure to realise 
the urgent need for action, including the impact of the climate variable, may send the country 
into a deep crisis. This is largely due to the fact that a global decrease in oil demand could 
serve to slash Russian revenues while costs associated with extreme weather events could 
increase substantially (ibid, 12).  
 
 
5.3 Norwegian dependence on Russian petroleum fields  
 
The resource pictures in Norway and Russia differ greatly. While Russia has several 
unexplored areas, Norway’s options are more limited, a fact that has become increasingly 
evident after the year 2000. The Norwegian petroleum industry has therefore strongly 
advocated for increased activity in the North. On the Russian side, however, companies have 
been more hesitant. Both in Norway and in Russia regional interests have generally been 
positive towards development, but regional concerns are greater in Norway. In Norway, 
environmental considerations have already worked to slow down developments. 
Contrastingly, environmental constraints have so far not played any noticeable role in Russian 
developments. The role played by the environment, however, is not irrelevant. In Russia, 
environmental regulations have the potential to stop or delay industrial development, but such 
concerns are brought in at a later stage in the planning process than in Norway. While Russian 
companies are expected to play a dominant role in the development of offshore resources, 
they are currently not ready to play this role, and development is therefore slow. The main 
driver for the Shtokman development, for example, was Gazprom’s interest in the LNG 
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market. While uncertainties relating to costs and time frame were evident from the start, it 
was more general market uncertainties that took over from 2009. The financial crisis caused 
gas demand in Russia’s export markets to fall. This was even more so the case within Russia, 
which caused a reduction in Russian gas production by 12.4% that same year (Moe 2010: 
244-245). Regardless of the delimitation dispute, which will be expanded on in chapter 6, and 
the disagreement concerning the continental shelf around the Svalbard archipelago, the 
petroleum relationship between Norway and Russia has been cooperative in nature. Neither 
state have let disagreements spill over into areas where cooperation may occur, or have 
occurred previously (ibid, 247).  
 
After its international law violation on the Crimean Peninsula, Norwegian politicians 
condemned Russia. This unison criticism was primarily expressed through the Norwegian 
elite supporting the sanctions implemented by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO) in accordance with the European Union’s penalties. This Norwegian condemnation 
was also visible in the political rhetoric. Norwegian members of parliament clearly stated that 
the Russian handling of Ukraine and Crimea was unacceptable. Bilateral ties were virtually 
suspended for 20 months after the annexation of Crimea. During this time, the conception of 
Russia as an aggressor, which viewed foreign policy as a zero-sum game without 
consideration for other interests, in line with realism, was clearly present among the 
Norwegian political elite (Jervis 1998: 986). The Norwegian government chose to reply to 
these violations by strengthening NATO and more general ties between liberal democracies 
(Nilssen 2015: 35–54). However, while the government has been consistent in expressing its 
condemnation of Russia for its actions in Ukraine, it has also underlined the possibility for 
cooperation bilaterally. In other words, there exists a duality in the Norwegian policy towards 
Russia, intended to serve the fact that Norway is a NATO member all the while comforting its 
neighbour Russia, previously the SU. This balancing act has gradually become more 
important again since Russia’s annexation of Crimea (Rowe 2018: 7-8).  
 
As Norway is a natural gas supplier to the EU, it is as viewed as a competitor by Russia. In 
2006, for instance, Norwegian gas compensated for a decrease in the Russian supply due to 
the Russia-Ukraine gas conflict (Baev 2012; Baran 2007). Similarly, when plans to develop 
the Shtokman field failed in 2012, after the treaty was signed, this was largely because 
Norway’s Statoil gave up its shares in the project as there was no market for the gas due to 
booming shale production in the US. Despite their history of cooperation, the question has 
 
 61 
often been whether these two states can overcome their internal differences in terms of the 
state-controlled Russian political system versus the more open Norwegian market model. 
Evidently, there have been strong dissimilarities in the type of petro-state that each player has 
represented with varying relations between state and society (Orttung and Wenger 2016: 90). 
Nonetheless, this does not seem to have stopped either Norway or Russia from wanting to 
cooperate with one another, particularly on petroleum matters pertaining to the High North.  
 
5.4 Petroleum interdependence from a game theoretical perspective 
 
According to game theory, the signaling games literature is problematic in that it assumes 
states to be unitary actors where either the head of state decides policy or decision-makers 
hold exactly the same preferences as one another. Rather than focusing on exactly why beliefs 
change, it is rather necessary to understand how and when decision-makers are able to convert 
their beliefs into policy. Thus, a comprehensive understanding of state interactions need to 
clarify not only why beliefs change but also which circumstances do or do not influence 
policy change (Walsh 2007: 446). In this sense, it is vital to examine how the Norwegian 
government has changed its behavior towards Russia, not only in relation to changes in 
petroleum developments, but also in relation to recent Russian international law violations.  
 
Russian aggression towards the West 
The aftermath of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and war in eastern Ukraine in 2014 has 
witnessed a heated debate surrounding how to comprehend current Russian foreign policy. 
The discussion has largely centred on the need to counter and balance Russia’s 
‘aggressiveness’, due to its unpredictable and rule-changing behavior (Staun 2017: 314). 
However, contrary to the view that it is impossible to cooperate with Russia these days, 
Russia’s policy towards the Arctic makes it look nothing like a classic revisionist power. In 
this region, it rather appears like a power with a grounded, long-term strategy. It is a paradox 
that Russia, while continuously breaking the ‘rules of the game’ in Ukraine, has obeyed the 
‘rules of the game’ in the Arctic region (ibid). To exemplify, Russia has been a great 
supporter of the AC and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) and has followed the rules 
when it comes to The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
delineation, as well as meeting deadlines associated with the Commission on the Limits of the 
 
 62 
Continental Shelf (CLCS) (Carlson 2013). Further, it has not acted threatening towards its 
neighbors or members of the AC (Staun 2017: 314). Nonetheless, the uncertainties 
surrounding political developments in Russia may affect the development of petroleum 
resources in the northern part of the country. The driving forces behind these developments 
may be observed at the national level in Russia as well as within the wider international 
development discourse (Angell, Eikeland and Selle 2010: 183).  
 
Currently, Russia is reacting to an excessive Western, and particularly American, presence 
and threat near its borders, by using newly acquired wealth to regain its great power status. 
This strategy should be considered one of soft-balancing. Such a strategy entails a limited 
military buildup coupled with preventative measures intended to delay or discourage 
aggressive policies by another great power. The end goal of this kind of strategy is to gain the 
necessary military and economic capabilities to protect national sovereignty. The economy is 
crucially important for this strategy and in Russia's case, the petroleum sector is vital to its 
economy. As a matter of fact, Russia’s assertiveness and material capacities can be viewed as 
a strategic response to its oil and gas revenues (Piskunova 2010: 852). This concern and a 
need for oil prices to be high is mirrored by Norway, but because Norway has embraced the 
impacts of climate change to a greater extent, this is not as obvious as in the case of the 
currently struggling Russian economy.  
 
Norwegian diplomacy towards Russia 
 
As alluded to above, Norway and other states reacted to Russian international law violations 
by sanctioning this behavior. However, the literature concerned with sanctions tell us that 
they only rarely make the receiving country change its policies. Another well-established 
finding is that when do sanctions work, it is often at the threat stage, even before the 
threatened sanctions have been implemented (Hovi 2008: 105). Just like the actions of other 
states affect Russia, changes in energy markets affect both Russia and Norway. As of today, it 
is impossible to deny the fact that Russia is an energy-intensive state and a major petroleum 
exporter. Global energy markets will thus unquestionably have an impact on developments in 
the Barents Sea and the surrounding areas. However, the uncertainties associated with this 




Evidence from experimental studies suggest that players, rather than being fully rational, 
make complex decisions based on suboptimal rules. This is as players are mutually 
interdependent in these situations. This means that the welfare of one player is determined by 
the actions of other players in the game, at least to some extent, and this leads players to act 
strategically rather than purely basing their moves on instrumental rationality (Romp 1997: 2-
4; Sen 1977). Similarly, Norwegian-Russian petroleum relations in the High North can be 
likened to the folk theorem, central to any discussion on infinitely repeated games (Rasmusen 
1989). The first condition of this game is that the time preference is zero, or positive and 
sufficiently small. The second is that the probability that the game ends at any repetition is 
zero, or positive and sufficiently small. This type of game supposes that if a game is infinitely 
repeated, many strategy combinations are in equilibrium. Given the proposition that players 
value future payoffs and believe that the game is continuous, many sets of moves made by 
any player will be in equilibrium. This indeterminacy is a significant feature of this game. 
Given this, many political scientists have argued the case that by infinitely repeating a game, 
the new equilibrium is mutual cooperation. Although mutual cooperation is a possible 
equilibrium, it is only one of many possible equilibria (Gates and Humes 1997: 93-94).  
 
Games with multiple Nash equilibria 
 
In any situation where there are multiple Nash equilibria, it is not always clear which one is 
the solution to the game. An outcome is a Nash equilibrium if no player can profit from 
unilaterally changing strategy so that the outcome becomes different. Thus, in a Nash 
equilibrium, each individual player has maximised his own payoff (Hermansson 1990: 107). 
The folk theorem game, where players can engage in explicit pre-play negotiations, 
demonstrates how repetition can greatly increase the amount of self-enforcing agreements 
players are willing to adhere to. If players play the Prisoner’s Dilemma game once and never 
meet again, no amount of pre-play negotiation will enable the players to cooperate. In order to 
cooperate, then, players need to be able to form a binding agreement that includes an 
enforcement mechanism, which exists outside the boundaries of the game described. 
However, if this situation is repeated, there are many self-enforcing agreements the players 
might come to. The existence of a Nash equilibrium gives a necessary condition for an 
obvious way to play the game, without prejudging the existence of an obvious way to play the 
game. Without pre-play communication, the players need to rely on convention, learned 
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behavior, or a focal point to make their move in situations of multiple equilibria (Kreps 1990: 
512-513).  
 
Equilibrium analysis presupposes that people have a lot of common knowledge. Common 
knowledge is information that all players know, and all players know that other players know 
and so on. A lack of such common knowledge would challenge the ability to conduct 
equilibrium analysis, as a player would not know what to expect from the other. In this way, 
effective signaling would be deemed impossible if the sender could not predict the effect of 
the signal on the receiving player (Morrow 1994: 307). Binmore (1991) differentiates 
between eductive and evolutive processes of equilibrium. Eductive processes, on the one 
hand, are based on reasoning. It is a logical process that involves reflection on what other 
players will do. An evolutive process, on the other hand, uses evolution in order to reach 
equilibrium. The problem is, nonetheless, that human rationality seems to fall somewhere 
between these two opposites and progressing towards a complete understanding will 
necessitate a scrutiny of both. Thankfully, game theory offers an important step towards fully 
understanding rationality in settings of a strategic nature (Morrow 1994: 311).  
 
Realist assumptions present in games  
Support for contingent realism can be found in the literature that desires to explore 
cooperation under anarchy. Cooperation theory provides insights that highlight the 
importance of each state’s beliefs about the other player’s preferences. Given this assumption, 
the state comparing the value of the agreement and the risks of being cheated faces four 
possible outcomes: the agreement prevails (CC); the competitor cheats (CD); mutual 
defection (DD); or, the state itself cheats, gaining an advantage in subsequent negotiations 
(DC). Unlike in a PD game, in a Stag Hunt (SH) game, a game that describes a conflict 
between safety and social cooperation, it can be individually rational for two states to 
cooperate. This is as there are two pure strategy Nash equilibria in this game; when both 
players cooperate and when both players defect. Cooperation is therefore not given if the 
states are unsure of one another’s preference orderings. For instance, a state with Stag Hunt 
preferences believing that it faces a state with Prisoner's Dilemma preferences should defect 




A state that is uncertain about the other player’s preferences, should consider the magnitude 
of the differences between its payoffs. This is when the danger posed by cheating comes into 
play. The prospects for cooperation also depend on the states' preferences in the game. 
Cooperation should happen if the two states believe they are playing a SH game. However, 
cooperation can also be possible if the states believe they are playing PD game. This is 
because, given their strategy for dealing with defection, when repeated, the game can turn out 
to be a Stag Hunt game. Therefore, a way to change the game to a Stag Hunt game is by 
repeating the given PD game played under certain conditions (ibid, 82-83). Figure 7 below 








R = 5, R= 5                 
Reward for mutual 
cooperation 
S = 0, T = 3                 
Sucker’s payoff, and 
temptation to defect 
Defect 
Rabbit 
T = 3, S = 0           
Temptation to defect and 
sucker’s payoff 
P = 3, P = 3              
Punishment for mutual 
defection 
 
Figure 7. The Stag Hunt Game  
 
Given this gloomy picture, which variables ultimately dampen the impact of anarchy and the 
security dilemma in the international system? The workings of several can be seen in terms of 
the Stag Hunt or repeated plays of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. The Prisoner 's Dilemma differs 
from the Stag Hunt in that there is no solution that is in the best interest of all players. In this 
sense, there are offensive as well as defensive incentives to defect from cooperating with 
other players. If the game were to be played only once, the only rational thing to do would be 
to defect. However, if the game were to be repeated infinitely, this logic no longer applies. 
The game could then be analysed in a similar fashion to the Stag Hunt game. In this scenario, 
it would be in the interest of each player to deprive the other player of the power to defect. 
 
 66 
This is because each player would be willing to sacrifice this ability if the other player was 
similarly restrained. If the other player was not restrained in this manner, however, then it 
would be in the interest of any player to retain the power to defect in the game (Jervis 1978: 
167-171). 
 
Figure 8 below illustrates how an extensive form version of the Stag Hunt game may be 
played out. The main difference between the extensive form version of the PD game outlined 
previously and the SH game outlined below is the change in the payoff structure. Unlike in 
the PD game, it could be deemed individually rational for states involved in a SH game to 
cooperate. However, as mentioned above, cooperation is not assured if the states are not 
aware of one another’s preference orderings (Glaser 1995: 82).  
 
 
Figure 8. Extensive Form Representation of a Stag Hunt Game 
 
While realism as a theory of international politics has generally ignored the decision-making 
level of analysis, game theory can incorporate the empirical findings in this area. To 
understand when cooperation happens, it is necessary to understand how different beliefs and 
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values can influence the states' evaluation of game outcomes. Further, it is important to be 
aware of whether self-interest is defined unenthusiastically or is driven by care for what 
happens to the other state. If the latter applies, the significant factors will lie outside the 
anarchy framework. Robert Keohane has pinpointed that cooperation may be explained partly 
by the fact that states can only use bounded rationality. State officials need to sustain their 
cognitive resources, and shared principles can therefore be enormously helpful in easing the 
burdens of prediction, coordination and choice. State officials do not automatically 
reciprocate cooperation or defection. Instead, their behavior is influenced by their analysis 
of what the other state did and why it did so. Most state behavior is ambiguous and so are the 
intentions underlying these actions. How states respond is therefore affected by their analysis 
as to whether the other state intended the outcome that was produced, the behavior is best 
explained by the situation the other was in, or by their personality. Besides, given the 
interactive nature of international politics, the understanding a state official has of the other 
state’s actions is affected by how he thinks his own state is behaving toward the other state. In 
this way, state officials may think that they are cooperating when a neutral bystander would 
imply that they are, to a certain degree, defecting (Jervis 1988: 336-337).  
 
Realism does, however, not imply endless conflict. The affinity between realism and 
neoliberal institutionalism is not the only reason to doubt the claim that realism has no place 
for cooperation. This view would imply that conflict of interest is total and that whatever one 
state gains, others must lose. This vision of a zero-sum world is implausible. The sense of 
international politics as characterized by constant bargaining, which is central to realism, 
implies a mixture of common and conflicting interests. More worthy of exploration is the less 
extreme view that realism sees world politics as much more conflictful than does neoliberal 
institutionalism (Jervis 1999: 44-46). To view international politics as a Hobbesian state of 
nature does not suggest that warfare is constant, but only that there is always a possibility for 
war and that states in the international system understand this. Even if the anticipation of 
conflict may serve to make it more likely, it can also push states to act to reduce the danger of 
conflicts occurring (Jervis 1998: 986). 
 
Realism is known for arguing that power must be located in one place in order to reach the 
state's objectives. For realists, nevertheless, it is equally important that goals fit within the 
possibilities created by this arrangement of power. Realism also attempts to understand the 
conditions under which states are likely to cooperate and the strategies that states can use to 
 
 68 
encourage cooperation. This line of reasoning is sometimes linked to neoliberalism, but the 
two are difficult to separate in this regard. Separating them would be easier if realism viewed 
conflict as zero-sum, and believed states to be on the Pareto frontier. This argument supports 
the view from neoclassical economics that all relations have progressed to be maximally 
efficient, but political relationships are often tragic because states are oftentimes unable to 
realise and take advantage of their mutual interests. Offensive realists see aggression and 
expansionism as omnipresent and stress the prevalence of extreme conflict of interest. 
Defensive realists, on the other hand, believe that much of international politics is a PD game 
or a more complex security dilemma. Therefore, the desire to gain intertwines with the need 
for protection. As a consequence, a lot of the work of state officials is concerned with 
structuring situations so that states can maximise their mutual interests (ibid). This line of 
reasoning can be seen in terms of the Delimitation Agreement, as Norway and Russia were 
able to realise their mutual interests and take advantage of them. This will be discussed 
further in the next chapter. 
 
In this sense, morality and fairness concerns are almost always going to play a large part in 
the explanation for the fact that states cooperate much more in reality than the PD game 
scenario would have us to expect. Indeed, it is possible that morality is the sole way to reach 
many mutually cooperative outcomes. Partly due to the tendency of states to be self-righteous 
and view their own behavior as cooperative and that of other states as hostile, fear and 
temptation may yield mutually unwanted outcomes so long as narrow self-interest dictates 
behavior. However, at the very least, the feeling of being morally obligated to reciprocate 
cooperation and expect other states to act according to the same code of conduct, should allow 
for a wider range and scope for mutually beneficial outcome (Jervis 1988: 348).  
 
Simply arguing that states are the central actors in the international system does not help us 
understand which interests they will pursue. While it may be the case that all states want a 
high measure of security, some states strive for other goals, which may lead to a disregard for 
their own security. Even if security is the main goal of states, this does not tell state officials, 
what behavior will ultimately secure this outcome (Jervis 1998: 982). Nonetheless, looking at 
the negotiations leading up to the Varangerfjord Agreement, the Grey Zone Agreement and 
the Delimitation Agreement will highlight, to some extent, what kind of behavior by state 
officials has secured cooperative Norwegian-Russian petroleum relations in the High North.  
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6 Agreements  
 
 
This chapter will analyse the cooperative petroleum relationship between Norway and Russia 
in the High North by means of the Varangerfjord Agreement, the Grey Zone Agreement and 
the Delimitation Agreement. These agreements have been chosen because they build on each 
other from a time perspective and because, although they were intended to relax tensions 
between Norwegian and Russian fishing vessels operating in this area, these negotiations 
were influenced by both states’ hope to explore and extract petroleum resources on the seabed 
of Arctic waters. This chapter will start off by explaining how negotiations can be viewed 
through the lens of game theory and then proceed to discuss the three agreements mentioned 
above in chronological order.  
 
6.1 Negotiations from a game theoretical perspective 
 
A negotiation can be said to take place when explicit proposals are unveiled in order to reach 
agreement on the realisation of a common interest where there are conflicting interests (Iklé 
1964: 3-4). In this respect, it is worth noting that the higher the player's benefits from 
negotiations ending in war, the higher the likelihood that the dispute will actually end in war. 
On the other hand, if the dispute is settled short of war, the better is the negotiated settlement 
(Banks 1990: 612). Given that Norway and Russia have a lengthy history of relatively good 
neighbourly relations that they can draw on to support their efforts to settle border disputes, 
such negotiations are unlikely to end in conflict, and even less so, in war.  
 
Scholars have argued that issues related to international cooperation all share a common 
structure. Therefore, such issues have often been evaluated by reference to simple matrix 
games, such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma game or the Stag Hunt game outlined above (Fearon 
1998: 269). Before an international agreement can be enforced, implemented and monitored, 
negotiations must take place to determine which of many possible agreements can be put in 
place. Framing the issue as a problem of bargaining, then enforcement, means that states may 
interact in ways that emphasise future payoffs rather than present ones. In this sense, states 
will have a greater incentive to bargain in order to secure a good deal. While this may serve to 
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limit cooperation in the present, this trade-off is struck to ensure more rewarding cooperation 
and better terms of agreement in the future (ibid, 296).  
 
In this respect, orthodox economic theory tells us that most agreements tend to lie within a 
certain range, labelled the range of practicable bargains by Pigou, and this range is defined by 
two distinct properties. Firstly, they fall on the Edgeworth contract curve, which is the point 
where neither party’s position can be improved without at the same time worsening the 
position of the other party. This point is also known as the point of Pareto optimality. The two 
limits, which can be labelled maximum-concession points, are the points where neither player 
would accept an agreement that put them in a worse position than not reaching an agreement. 
Put simply, each player’s maximum-concession point is the point where the net gain resulting 
from the agreement would only favour the other player. What make negotiations difficult, 
then, is that current economic theory does not explain how the position of the actual 
agreement point is determined within this range of practicable bargains and how the division 
of the net gain is determined between the two negotiating parties (Harsanyi 1956: 144-145). 
However, evaluating the Varangerfjord Agreement, the Grey Zone Agreement and the 
Delimitation Agreement should help us understand some of reasoning behind why 
Norwegian-Russian petroleum relations have remained cooperative.  
 
6.2 The Varangerfjord Agreement 
 
The cooperative petroleum relationship between Norway and Russia in the High North can be 
said to have evolved in three different phases. In the first phase, beginning in 1957, these two 
states signed the Varangerfjord Agreement. This agreement defined the border between 
Norway and the then Soviet Union in the Varangerfjord, which lies in the southern part of the 
Barents Sea (Henriksen and Ulfstein 2011: 2). Negotiations on this boundary in the 
Varangerfjord, which were suggested by Norway in 1956 following the arrest of several 
Norwegian fishing vessels, started on the 14th of January 1957 and were concluded on the 15th 
of February 1957 (Elferink 1996b: 6). While this initial agreement is not often mentioned in 
the literature on the topic, it helped set the stage for discussions about the Barents Sea, where 
both states declared sovereignty over their respective continental shelves (Orttung and 
Wenger 2016: 89). All subsequent boundary negotiations and the concluding Barents Sea 
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Treaty, or Delimitation Agreement as it is also known, should therefore be viewed in the 
context of the starting point that was the Varangerfjord Agreement (Dahl 2015: 121).  
 
The maritime boundary between Russia and Norway starts from their respective land borders 
in the Varangerfjord. While Russia borders the eastern part of the fjord, Norway borders the 
western side. In the Varangerfjord, the relevant delimitation coasts are somewhat adjacent and 
partly opposite to one another. In the Barents Sea, therefore, the first part of the boundary is 
affected by the adjacent mainland coasts, while the second part of the boundary is influenced 
by the opposite coasts of Norway’s mainland territory, the Svalbard archipelago and the 
Russian archipelago of Novaya Zemlya. As a result, the boundary established by this 
agreement consists of two straight line parts, which each measure 12.6 miles and 11.8 miles 
respectively. The first part stretches from the end point of the land border to the intersection 
of the outer limits of the territorial seas of both states. In order to determine the exact point of 
this intersection, the territorial sea of the Soviet Union was measured from the low-water line, 
while the Norwegian territorial sea was measured from the Norwegian straight baseline in the 
Varangerfjord. The second part of the boundary stretches from the end point of the territorial 
sea boundary to the middle point of the closing line of the Varangerfjord. Thus, the boundary 
line in the Varangerfjord can be said to be favourable to Russia in comparison with an 
equidistance line giving full weight to the Norwegian straight baseline (Aasen 2010: 70-71; 
Elferink 1996b: 6-7). 
 
Conceptual difficulty is created by the fact that in many encounters, like the negotiations 
between Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea, the main stake is power, which is an 
extremely difficult concept. However, in almost all instances, power in international politics 
is relative rather than absolute. Knowing how much leverage one state has over another does 
not tell state officials or observers very much unless they also know how much leverage the 
other state has. Thus, it can be rational for state officials to attempt to lessen the absolute level 
of payoffs they receive from any particular agreement. This view of how to approach 
negotiations is not only compatible with realism, but is embedded in it. Thus, as long as 
power is central, an element of conflict will be involved, and this will serve to complicate the 
attempts of state officials to cooperate and undercut some of the prescriptions deduced from 
the anarchy framework. In fact, Stein has demonstrated that the dilemma of the hegemon is 
present within the realm of economic concerns because a major state that only worries about 
absolute gains is more likely to be surpassed by other states in the long term (1984; Jervis 
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1988: 334-335). This line of reasoning can be observed in the negotiations leading up to the 
Grey Zone Agreement, as the interests of both Norway and the then Soviet Union became 
more clear at this time, and both states were careful not to push each other too far.  
 
 
6.3 The Grey Zone Agreement 
 
As mentioned above, the delimitation dispute in the Barents Sea dates back to the 1957 
Varangerfjord Agreement, at the very least. This agreement served to establish the boundary 
between the territorial seas of mainland Norway and the Soviet Union (Henriksen and 
Ulfstein 2011: 2). The Grey Zone Agreement of 1978 between Norway and the Soviet Union, 
however, was meant to be a provisional arrangement, where the definitional properties of a 
negotiation were certainly present. Moreover, this agreement represented a politically 
contested settlement between two states with disproportional power capabilities, agreed upon 
during a tense stage of the Cold War, and heavily criticized in Norway for its alleged 
territorial concessions to the SU. The Grey Zone Agreement has its origins in a disagreement 
over the maritime border in the Barents Sea, as mentioned with regards to the Varangerfjord 
Agreement. This disagreement between these two states created a disputed area of 155,000 
square kilometres between the two opposing delimitation lines (Stabrun 2009: 2). 
 
During the 1970s, the existence of such a disputed area in the Barents Sea was a delicate issue 
for three key reasons. Firstly, the Barents Sea was of vital strategic importance to the security 
policies of both states. Taking into account this Cold War setting, any territorial concession in 
this area would have the potential to make for disastrous strategic consequences. Secondly, 
the Barents Sea was rich in living resources and therefore significant for economic reasons. 
Thirdly, the disputed area was believed to contain great oil and gas reserves, which made the 
issue of a final delimitation line highly sensitive to both states. Since the 1970s, Russia had 
claimed the border should be drawn directly through a line from the land border up to the 
North. Norway, on the other hand, had claimed that the border should lie midway between the 
Svalbard and Novaya Zemlya islands. From 1975 onwards, the delimitation dispute was 
highlighted by a radical transformation within the Law of the Sea. As a result of the 
negotiations at UNCLOS III, an international practice of EEZs stretching 200 nautical miles 
off maritime coasts was established. This newfound practice represented a massive judicial 
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leap, as similar maritime zones had previously been limited to a mere 12 nautical miles of 
territorial jurisdiction (ibid).  
 
From a game theoretical standpoint, it is evident that only limited information on possible 
outcomes is available in some games. In the case of the Grey Zone Agreement, each of the 
two states, Norway and the Soviet Union, is a group of players combined rather than an 
individual. This adds no significant issues if each state behaves consistently and therefore can 
be said to have a utility function. The process of negotiation can therefore be observed as a 
two-state bargaining game, and for the sake of simplicity, it does not make a difference to the 
states how a specific dispute is settled. Even though the analyst observing this game is not 
able to establish every single possible agreement, at least four outcomes are likely to be 
present, and these are as follows:  
A. No agreement.  
B. The Norwegian draft treaty 
C. The Soviet draft treaty  
D. A compromise treaty in the upper right part of the region of feasible outcomes. An 
important property of this kind of treaty is that it cannot be rewritten without making it 
less satisfactory to at least one of the players.  
Again, for the sake of simplicity, both states rank these outcomes in the order of their own 
draft being the most preferred, next the compromise treaty, then the other state’s draft, and 
lastly, no agreement (Axelrod 1970: 82).  
 
In so-called tug-of-war negotiations, which the Grey Zone Agreement can be said to 
represent, each state attempts to obtain the agreement that is the best possible alternative for 
them, in terms of their own preferences and interests as laid out above (Hovi 1998: 60). 
According to Axelrod’s logic laid out above, this would be either option B or C, depending on 
whether one is looking at it from the perspective of Norway or the SU (Axelrod 1970: 82).  
 
Overall, the conflict regarding zones in the Barents Sea centred on two major questions. First 
and foremost, Norway and the SU were unable to agree on maritime borders. On the whole, 
the Grey Zone Agreement was just a step in a long process that gradually made Norway’s 
room for manoeuvre smaller. The Grey Zone was meant to be temporary but became 
gradually more permanent in nature given that Norwegian and Soviet authorities continued to 
disagree on border concerns in the Barents Sea. Norwegian authorities were early on in the 
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negotiations prepared to accept a draft agreement based on equally sharing the disputed area, 
but this was not made clear to the SU until later. However, no agreement was reached until 
the UNCLOS extension to 200 nautical miles happened in January 1977. At this time, it is 
possible that Moscow, even more so than Oslo, wanted a deal to be struck as it was probably 
more problematic for a great power to have an unresolved delimitation dispute than it was for 
Norway. However, the delimitation question remained unresolved until 1978, when the 
agreement was still considered provisional in nature (Tamnes 1997: 291-295).  
 
The final agreement negotiated in 1977, signed in January 1978, and ratified by the 
Norwegian Parliament in March 1978, eventually provided an effective solution to the 
challenges related to resource management in the area. However, the agreed ‘area of 
application’ was not the disputed area, nor was it geographically balanced between the 
median line and the sector line. Instead, it was an ‘adjacent area’ considerably extended in the 
Western direction, so that, to a considerable extent, the geographical terms accommodated 
Soviet demands. In Oslo, the lack of territorial balance was seen by many in the political elite 
as a concession to Moscow. It was argued that the agreement would inevitably have a 
detrimental effect on the delimitation dispute in favor of the sector line, moving the Soviet 
sphere of influence significantly to the West. Furthermore, Norwegian acceptance of such 
unfavourable terms could end up jeopardising the credibility of Norwegian policy in the High 
North (Stabrun 2009: 1-5). 
 
The Grey Zone Agreement covered a large part of the southern area of the disputed waters as 
well as undisputed Norwegian and Soviet EEZs. Under the agreement, each state was to 
exercise jurisdiction solely over fishing vessels flying its own flag and over vessels flying the 
flag of third states that had access to the area under license. Since its signing, the Grey Zone 
agreement was extended for 1-year periods, until the Delimitation Agreement was finally 
signed in 2010 (Henriksen and Ulfstein 2011: 2). The Grey Zone Agreement only intended to 
determine who were to supervise fishing in the above-mentioned area so that negotiations 
regarding the delimitation of the continental shelf in the Barents Sea could continue and 
eventually be finalised. However, it can be argued that this agreement indirectly concerned 
petroleum matters as it demonstrated that neither state was willing to push for unilateral 
action on the petroleum side. While the Soviets tended towards doing so early in the 1980s, 
later negotiations have underlined the importance of petroleum issues to both states. Figure 9 
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below exposes the properties of the Grey Zone Agreement, and Norway and the SU’s 
respective EEZ limits. These new limits were the result of the negotiations at UNCLOS III.  
 
 
Figure 9. Map Illustrating the Process of the Grey Zone Agreement and the Two States’ EEZ 
Limits (Stabrun 2009: 5).  
 
 
During the negotiations and before the draft agreement was a reality, it was clear that 
geography, in the event of a conflict of interest between government objectives, should be 
given priority. The tension added to the bilateral relationship by Soviet missile tests and 
seismic surveys in the disputed area and its vicinity, served to highlight power asymmetries 
between the two states.
 
How the Norwegian government perceived the dilemma and how they 
framed the decision, also proves the priority that was given to conflict avoidance. It seems 
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that the decision to a large extent was made in light of the ‘disadvantages of non-acceptance’. 
Foreign policy advisors spoke of ‘what we must avoid’, instead of ‘what we get’.
 
Therefore, 
there was a marginal difference between this situation and a point where the sector line was 
the de facto delimitation line. As a result, when the government found itself in the situation 
where a draft agreement was on the table and further negotiations were considered unfeasible, 
the Grey Zone Agreement’s ability to prevent the sector line from being the de facto 
delimitation line through creating a provisional, jurisdictional regime, together with the risk 
of conflict and instability in the absence of an agreement, were the decisive factors for the 
government’s final decision (ibid, 29-35).  
 
Referring to Axelrod’s logic laid out above, it is clear that Norway wanted to avoid option A, 
known as no agreement. For both Norway and the Soviet Union, this would have been the 
worst possible outcome of the negotiations as both players ranked the possible outcomes in 
the order of their own draft being the most preferred, next the compromise treaty, then the 
other player’s draft, and lastly, no agreement. Norway therefore had to make concessions to 
secure option D, a compromise treaty satisfying both states to a certain extent (Axelrod 1970: 
82).  
 
This outcome of the negotiations can be said to be Pareto-efficient, as none of the states 
involved could have been made better off without making the other state worse off (Romp 
1997: 4). As the threat of punishment by the Soviets was sufficiently severe and appeared 
credible, the Norwegians were deterred from deviating (Dixit, Skeath, and Reiley 2015: 36). 
Thus, because Norway was the player under the most pressure during these negotiations, the 
compromise treaty ended up being more favourable to the Soviets. As a result, the political 
elite in Oslo was concerned with the lack of territorial balance inherent in the agreement and 
saw this compromise as a concession to Moscow (Stabrun 2009: 5). 
 
All in all, the geographical imbalances of the Grey Zone Agreement clearly reflected the SU’s 
power and negotiating strengths, even if the final grey zone laid further east than the Soviets 
initially thought. The Kremlin withdrew from the principle of the sector line, in which there 
was considerable prestige. While it was difficult to explain that Norwegian enforcement could 
not exercise fishery jurisdiction over Soviet fishers in the undisputed Norwegian area west of 
the sector line, it was equally awkward for the Soviet government to explain that they could 
not carry out inspections of Norwegian vessels in an area of close to 47 000 km squared that 
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the Soviet media and education system presented as indisputably Soviet (Kvalvik 2004: 67). 
Thus, while in Oslo the lack of territorial balance was seen by many in the political elite as a 
concession to Moscow, the final agreement was not entirely positive from a SU standpoint 
either (Stabrun 2009: 5).  
 
 
6.4 The Delimitation Agreement 
 
Encouraging good outcomes in games is not only about lecturing players that there is more to 
be had from mutual cooperation than mutual defection. It is also a way of altering the 
attributes shaping the interaction so that cooperation in the long run may become the norm 
(Axelrod 2006: 141). This can definitely be said to be the case for the Barents Sea 
Delimitation Agreement of 2010. However, to make sense of the Delimitation Agreement, it 
is necessary to consult the preceding negotiations and the Grey Zone Agreement.  
 
The position held by Norway during the negotiations with the SU over the delimitation line in 
the Barents Sea was that a border should be laid out according to the median line principle. 
The SU, on the other hand, held that the sector line should be followed because of special 
circumstances. These opposing claims would leave a sizable disputed area of 155 000 
kilometres squared, greater than the Norwegian shelf in the North Sea, unresolved. Norway 
had always been vocal that it would be willing to renegotiate and find a satisfying 
compromise. A ‘unitization clause’ was also proposed, outlining that any petroleum finds 
cutting across the border would be exploited by both states (Moe, Fjærtoft and Øverland 
2011: 146).  
 
However, the Soviet Union was not impressed or convinced by any proposal put forward by 
the Norwegian government. This unwillingness to budge was a long-standing refusal on the 
Soviet side to admit even the existence of a disputed area, and their solution to the border 
dispute was branded as the only possible solution. However, the negotiations were more of a 
tug-of-war than is often realised. When Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers Nikolai 
Ryzhkov visited Norway, for instance, he proposed the creation of a ‘zone of cooperation and 
confidence’ for joint resource exploration in the disputed territory. However, this zone would 
also cover undisputed territory. Norway could not accept such an arrangement given that joint 
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jurisdiction was the one clause that the Norwegian government had been wishing to avoid 
(Moe 1990: 135-136).  
 
While a temporary agreement had been in place since 1978 regarding fisheries, it was only in 
2010 that both countries finally solved their border dispute in the High North. To understand 
the magnitude of the agreement, it is necessary to keep in mind that it involved an area in the 
Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean greater than the landmass of Ireland and Portugal 
combined. On the 15th of September 2010, Norway and Russia signed an agreement 
pertaining to the delimitation of an area the size of 175 000 square kilometres in the Barents 
Sea and in the Arctic (Jespersen and Vestergaard 2015: 142).  
 
The explanation behind the timing of the 2010 agreement resolving the marine delimitation 
dispute between Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea needs to be found mainly on the 
Russian side. The willingness of Russia to compromise on the spatial disagreement at this 
exact time was not, as is commonly thought, driven by an ambition to extract petroleum 
resources in the previously disputed area. Rather it was the product of wider Russian foreign 
policy concerns. Such efforts included a general desire to decrease tensions and the risk of 
conflict with neighbouring states by resolving as many territorial disputes as possible, 
strengthening UNCLOS as the dominant framework for Arctic governance, and overall, 
improving Russia’s image as a rule-abiding player internationally. The formerly disputed area 
is also strategically and economically significant as it is the gateway to Russia’s only port that 
remains ice free all year in Murmansk, the entrance to the Northern Sea Route, and the 
shipping route for oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the East Barents and Kara Seas 
(Moe, Fjærtoft and Øverland 2011: 145). 
 
This delimitation dispute also served to impact Norwegian petroleum activities. In 1976, 
while the NPD were conducting seismic surveys in this area, the SU announced that the 
territory was a target area for missile testing, effectively signaling Norway to stop 
exploration. While neither seismic surveying nor missile testing are legally opposed to 
international law in open seas, the episode was not one characterized by mutual trust or 
cooperation (Moe 1990: 135-136).  
 
However, while the potential for large-scale petroleum development highlights the stakes and 
the importance of achieving a settlement, it cannot sufficiently clarify why negotiations were 
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successful at this time. Similarly, the positive trend in bilateral relations and new standards 
within international law may explain part of the picture but may be said to have limited 
explanatory power in this case. Rather, it is likely that maturing negotiations, Russia’s efforts 
to solve territorial disputes and the aspiration to be viewed as a rule-abiding international 
actor all aid in trying to explain why the dispute was settled precisely in 2010. Although no 
factor can fully justify the timing of this settlement, these factors must be considered in 
combination. Nevertheless, many explanations point to the aspiration to boost UNCLOS as 
the most important Arctic governance framework as having been a very significant motivation 
for the Russia. In the aftermath of the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration, this motivation cannot be 
said to be unique to Russia, but rather a coherent push by Arctic littoral states to falsify the 
myth of a so-called ‘scramble’ for the Arctic (Moe, Fjærtoft and Øverland 2011: 158).  
 
What is clear, however, is that by virtue of their agreement, these two states have used a 
delimitation method that is similar to equitable principles. In fact, most disputes of this sort 
that have been settled between Arctic states show that there exist different ways of deciding 
the final delimitation terms. Most states are willing to employ the equal distance principle, but 
the decisive choice of delimitation method happens according to the surrounding 
circumstances, including the parties’ respective negotiating positions. Thus, most Arctic states 
will use the equal distance principle, so long as no surrounding circumstances necessitate the 
use of a different delimitation method (Jespersen and Vestergaard 2015: 142). Again, 
referring to Axelrod’s logic employed above, it is apparent that the Delimitation Agreement 
constitutes a version of option D, namely a compromise treaty (Axelrod 1970: 82). This is as 
both players were willing to settle for a delimitation line known for its equal payoffs to both 
negotiating states.  
 
This settlement could be characterised as a Nash equilibrium point. This is because both 
Norway and Russia have maximised their own payoff at this point (Binmore 2007; 
Hermansson 1990: 107). As such, none of them could have achieved a better payoff by 
switching to some other strategy that was available to them while the other state adhered to 
the strategies specified to them. This understanding ensured that both players recognised that 
these strategies were best replies to the situation at hand. However, these negotiations may 
also have been a case of rational learning by way of repeated games. If so, both states 
involved started off with hypotheses about which strategies the other state might employ. The 
other state then responded with their best replies and given this gradual understanding, both 
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states updated their strategies as they observed the actions of the other state in the game. In 
this way, both Norway and Russia eventually learned to play this Barents Sea delimitation 
dispute game, one move at a time, and therefore ended up resolving the dispute in 2010 
(Morrow 1994: 305-306). 
 
A unique feature of these delimitation negotiations between Norway and Russia was that they 
occurred between a superpower and a relatively small state, which one must assume 
influenced the negotiations. Katzenstein explains that small states are considered small mainly 
because of their economic vulnerability, and that their political strategies therefore differ 
compared to large states (2003: 11-12). However, it is worth questioning whether Norway 
should in fact be considered a small state in this region, given its strong Arctic maritime 
power and presence (Wegge 2013: 76). Furthermore, Norway’s negotiating rival experienced 
a regime change during the process of negotiating these three agreements, becoming Russia 
instead of the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, scholars have argued that this regime change ended 
up barely having an effect on the structural imbalance between these two states, as Russia still 
maintained its military interests and frameworks with regards to the High North. Thus, in 
order to understand if, and how, the asymmetry in power influenced the course and output of 
the negotiations, it is necessary to differentiate between each state’s position as an 
international actor, and the power relationship between the two states in the given bilateral 
negotiations (Kvalvik 2004: 59; Rottem, Jensen and Hønneland 2008).  
 
To better understand the relationship between Russia and Norway in these negotiations, it 
could be worthwhile to mention Russia’s relationship with Sweden during the same time 
period. It has been argued that the changes in Soviet foreign policy that occurred under the 
instruction of Mikhail Gorbachev were instrumental in bringing about a settlement of the 
delimitation dispute with Sweden. However, this change can only partly explain why a 
compromise was reached. This is because the Soviet Union did not make comparable 
initiatives towards Norway over their delimitation dispute in the Barents Sea. One important 
difference between the two disputes, and the respective bilateral relationships, however, was 
the fisheries regime. While a Norwegian-Soviet provisional arrangement in the Barents Sea 
operated successfully, overfishing was an issue in the disputed area in the Baltic Sea, and the 
wish to regulate fisheries therefore contributed to the conclusion of a delimitation agreement 




Today, there are a number of explanations for why Russia decided to settle the delimitation 
dispute in the Barents Sea at this exact time. Firstly, the evolution of international law 
changed the premises for negotiations. Secondly, improvements in bilateral relations between 
Norway and Russia made a settlement possible. Thirdly, the ambition to extract oil and gas in 
the disputed area was a major driver. Fourthly, the cost of unresolved border disputes was 
rising for Russia, and the agreement with Norway represents a general effort to solve as many 
such negotiations as possible. Fifthly, Russia wanted to be observed as a constructive 
international actor, and finally, Russia wanted to put UNCLOS forward as the framework for 
Arctic governance so as to halt the involvement of non-littoral states in the region (Moe, 
Fjærtoft and Øverland 2011: 148-158).  
 
On the whole, the settlement of this delimitation dispute came as a surprise to both experts 
and the public as no leaks had surfaced from the negotiations. Within the NMFA, only a few 
senior staff who were directly involved in the negotiations knew that an agreement would 
come about. The Russian government had been equally secretive. In effect, the final treaty 
divides the formerly disputed area into two close to equal sides. Apart from outlining the 
maritime boundary, the treaty also underlines the terms associated with the development of 
oil or gas fields spanning the new boundary. More generally, it encourages more cooperation 
between the two states in this region (ibid, 145-146). To illustrate, figure 10 below 
demonstrates the properties of the Delimitation Agreement and highlights the location of 





Figure 10. Map Illustrating the Process of the Delimitation Agreement and Petroleum 
Discoveries in the Barents Sea (ibid, 146).  
 
 
While the reasons behind the treaty are many, the treaty is a significant step for both Norway 
and Russia. As mentioned above, the success of the negotiations can be attributed to a number 
of factors. Firstly, the existence of the international regulatory framework UNCLOS helped 
make the agreement come about. The principles of this framework seem to have helped the 
negotiations and informed the final delimitation decision. While the intricate details of the 
situation that eventually persuaded Norway to accept a moderate westward deviation from the 
median line in favour of Russia’s sector claim are unknown, the solution achieved does not 
deviate much from an equidistance line (Jensen 2011: 157). 
 
In this respect, the location of the delimitation line is justified from an international law 
perspective and in relation to comparable cases. To illustrate, the International Court of 
Justice has oftentimes used the median line as a starting point, subsequently changing the 
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final boundary to fit the relevant circumstances of the agreement in question. In the case of 
this boundary dispute between Russia and Norway, it is believed that Russian arguments for 
the westward shift of the delimitation line could have pinpointed important differences in the 
length of the two states’ coastlines (ibid, 157-158).  
 
Secondly, foreign policy changes seems to have provided for much of the driving force during 
the negotiations. This is as bilateral border solutions, including those concerned with 
functional zones at sea, are achieved due to the fact that both states are willing to make 
concessions. In the case in question, Russia and Norway ended up at a compromise which 
respects, to a certain extent, both countries original positions. As the UNCLOS stands today, 
it only encourages states to sit down together and discuss lines of delimitation that are 
acceptable to them both. Fortunately for the two states involved in this case, both Norway and 
Russia are currently examples of stable foreign policy actors with good bilateral ties that are 
able to merge their respective interests and achieve long-term solutions that both states can be 
pleased with. The Russia of the 1990s, on the other hand, represents a completely different 
story (ibid). 
 
Additionally, there were economic reasons why these two states had been eager to agree on a 
boundary in this region. This is because an agreed maritime border allows states to put into 
place domestic legislation tied to international law, for instance in relation to the oil and gas 
industry. This goes not only for the previously disputed area, but for the Barents Sea as a 
whole. Finally, the mutual trust between these two states is paramount to the successful 
outcome of these negotiations. Overall, bilateral relations between Russia and Norway in 
recent years have been characterised as respectful, and there has been a definitive willingness 
between the two states to reach a satisfactory solution (ibid; Rowe and Hønneland 2010).  
As a result, there are several reasons why Norway and Russia ultimately managed to settle 
their delimitation dispute. Game theory and realism can help shed light on some of these 
reasons. Similarly, there are several reasons why Norwegian-Russian petroleum relations in 
the High North have remained cooperative. The reasons for this cooperative relationship will 





7 Discussion and conclusion 
 
The research question considered in this thesis is the following: Why have Norwegian-
Russian petroleum relations in the High North remained cooperative?  
 
This final chapter will start by discussing the main findings of this thesis by way of the two 
hypotheses analysed in relation to the agreements presented. Further, this chapter will analyse 
which hypothesis is best at explaining petroleum cooperation between Norway and Russia in 
the High North, and highlight the implications of these findings. This chapter will then 
evaluate potential other variables that could have been hypothesised to explain this bilateral 
relationship. After, suggestions will be given for further research relevant to the research 
question. This chapter will then highlight how, if attempted again, this thesis formulation 




7.1 Main findings 
 
This thesis has considered two hypotheses in order to explain why Norwegian-Russian 
petroleum relations in the High North have remained cooperative. These hypotheses focus on 
mutual interests in the region and the possibility of benefitting from the others’ petroleum 
resources and expertise, respectively. In light of the findings from the agreements presented in 
the previous chapter, it is worth discussing which of the hypotheses evaluated in chapters 4 
and 5 can best explain the cooperative petroleum relations between Norway and Russia in the 
High North.  
 
The outcome of any negotiation may range between total disagreement and complete 
agreement, with different degrees of ambiguity in the final settlement. Furthermore, there are 
several side-effects of the process leading to the settlement that has nothing to do with the 
agreement between the two players, but rather deal with third parties, international publicity, 
and so on (Iklé 1964: 59). Had I attempted to combine all these heterogeneous effects, the 
negotiating process would have seamlessly intertwined with the field of international 
relations. However, such an approach is not possible. It is therefore essential to focus only on 
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the question of why the particular negotiation process lead to the agreement under 
investigation. Following this method, I find that a combination of mutual interests in the 
region and petroleum interdependence help make the Norwegian-Russian petroleum 
relationship in the High North cooperative. 
 
The signing of the Delimitation Agreement marked the end of a long stretch of negotiations. 
The process began in 1957 with the Varangerfjord Agreement, and the final Delimitation 
Agreement is considered a treaty of major significance to both Norway and Russia. The 
principles of the UNCLOS framework seem to have substantially aided the negotiations and 
informed the final delimitation decision. However, Norway was eventually persuaded to 
accept a moderate westward deviation from the median line in favour of Russia’s sector 
claim. While the reasons behind the acceptance of this deviation by the Norwegians are 
unknown, the end result does not deviate much from an equidistance line. In this respect, the 
location of the delimitation line is justified from an international law perspective and in 
relation to comparable cases. In relation to this boundary dispute between Russia and 
Norway, it is believed that Russian arguments for the westward shift of the delimitation line 
could have pinpointed important differences in the length of the two states’ coastlines (Jensen 
2011: 157-158). 
 
In so-called tug-of-war negotiations, each player attempts to obtain the agreement that is the 
best possible alternative for them, in terms of their own preferences and interests (Hovi 1998: 
60). According to Axelrod’s logic, it is evident that the Delimitation Agreement constitutes a 
version of option D, namely a compromise treaty. An important property of this kind of 
agreement is that it cannot be rewritten without making it less satisfactory to at least one of 
the players (Axelrod 1970: 82). Furthermore, foreign policy changes seem to have provided 
for much of the driving force during the negotiations leading up to the Delimitation 
Agreement. In terms of the agreement in question, Russia and Norway ended up at a 
compromise which respects, to a certain extent, both countries original positions (Jensen 
2011: 158).  
 
As the UNCLOS stands today, it only encourages states to sit down together and discuss lines 
of delimitation that are acceptable to them both. Fortunately for the two states involved, both 
Norway and Russia are currently examples of stable foreign policy actors with good bilateral 
ties that are able to merge their respective interests and achieve long-term solutions that both 
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states can be pleased with. The Russia of the 1990s, on the other hand, represents a 
completely different story. Additionally, there are economic reasons why these two states 
were eager to agree on a boundary in 2010. Having an agreed maritime border put in place 
allows states to develop domestic legislation tied to international law, for instance in relation 
to the oil and gas industry. Finally, the mutual trust between these two states is important. 
Bilateral relations between Russia and Norway have in recent years been characterised as 
respectful, and there has been a definitive willingness between the two to reach a satisfactory 
solution (Moe, Fjærtoft and Øverland 2011; Rowe and Hønneland 2010). 
 
While the Russian rhetoric had been explicitly anti-Western for a while, there had also been 
conflicts of interest between Norway and Russia. The largest petroleum reserves in the High 
North still appear to be on the Russian side, and it would not be foolish to assume that one of 
the main objectives of the Norwegian High North strategy is to participate in the extraction of 
these. While individual projects in Norwegian foreign and security policy associated with 
Russia may have failed to some extent, bilateral relations more generally have prospered. Not 
only does this limit the prospect of conflict, but it may also help facilitate better resource 
exploitation in the Barents Sea, for both states (Hønneland and Rowe 2010a: 12-14). While 
clearly biased against Moscow and imposing sanctions, the Norwegian government has also 
emphasised the need for good neighbourly relations with Russia. This duality is testament to a 
long-standing tradition of balancing opposing elements in Norwegian policy towards Russia 
(Rowe 2018: 1). 
 
The lack of an international sovereign in the High North not only increases the theoretical 
likelihood for a war to take place, but also makes it difficult for states that are satisfied with 
the status quo to arrive at goals that they recognize as being in their common interest (Jervis 
1978: 167). To attempt to resolve this tendency to defect on issues pertaining to international 
relations, leadership situations in what would otherwise be known as Prisoner’s Dilemma 
games are common, and can be said to apply here. The role of leader often falls to the most 
well-established or largest of the players, in this case Russia (Dixit, Skeath and Reiley 2015: 
394). In such circumstances, the largest player may accept the leadership role since its own 
interests are closely tied with the other player. Further, if the largest player constitutes a 
substantial fraction of the issue or region, such a convergence of interests would seem 
obvious. In such a scenario, the largest player would be expected to behave more 
cooperatively than might otherwise be the case (ibid). This is what Russia has done and 
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continues to do. The willingness of Russia to compromise on the border disagreement in 2010 
was ultimately driven by a desire to decrease tensions and the risk of conflict with 
neighbouring states by resolving as many territorial disputes as possible, strengthening 
UNCLOS as the dominant framework for Arctic governance, and overall, improving its 
image as a rule-abiding player internationally (Moe, Fjærtoft and Øverland 2011: 145; 
Roberts 2015: 116). By doing so, Russia helped counter its, and other states’, realist urge to 
capture territory and concern with relative-gains in the international system (Krasner 1992). 
 
In a nutshell, the game theory literature on repeated games explains that the possibility of 
cooperation depends largely on three criteria. These include how patient players are, the 
actual magnitude of the payoff that players obtain from the various possible outcomes, and 
the length of the game (Glaser 1995: 82). Bó and Fréchette, however, find that there is no 
clear evidence that factors such as patience or altruism have a systematic impact on the 
tendency to cooperate in infinitely repeated games. Instead, the evidence suggests that the key 
reason for cooperative behavior is strategic (2018: 88). Axelrod, in this respect, demonstrates 
that the strategy known as tit-for-tat works quite well when there is a 1% error rate in the 
identification of the other state’s behavior. Nonetheless, this figure is drastically lower than 
that which can be expected in political interactions. George Downs and his colleagues have 
demonstrated that when the error rate is higher, this strategy is not likely to yield stable 
cooperation. Strategies that are not conditional on what the other state does, and that do not 
entail immediate reciprocation, may produce a change in the other state's attitudes, and may, 
as a result, be more effective than conventional analyses would suggest. As such, strict 
reciprocity may result in worse outcomes than initially expected. Cooperation is therefore 
more likely to come about when a state is willing to tolerate a higher level of perceived 
defection by the other state. Such a strategy, however, also increases the probability that the 
other state will, in fact, cheat (Jervis 1988: 339). 
 
Similarly, the discussion of the cooperation problem initiated by Mancur Olson in the mid-
1960s has resulted in a fruitful development of rationalistic theories. The basis for Olson's 
reasoning was that the emergence of cooperation in situations similar to that of the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma could not be explained unless the analysis involved factors of an irrational nature. A 
conventional Prisoner's Dilemma game, therefore, has no other solution than the suboptimal 
equilibrium that results from all players acting in a manner that is considered individually 
rational (Hermansson 1990: 169). Therefore, it would be appropriate to imply that the game 
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between Norway and Russia in the High North is more like a more like a partnership game 
than a zero-sum game, because of their respective utility functions (Shubik 1973). The theory 
of utility provided by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) is always consistent with the 
assumption that a state will maximise the mathematical expectation of their utility (Bishop 
1963: 560). Thus, if a state prefers A to B and B to C, then that same state will also always 
prefer A to C (Axelrod 1967: 88-89). Therefore, according to Axelrod’s logic, it is evident 
that the Delimitation Agreement constitutes a version of option D, namely a compromise 
treaty, and the fact that Norway and Russia were willing to settle their delimitation dispute in 
this fashion tell us a lot about their respective preference orderings (1970: 82). 
 
The basic orientation of game theoretic modelling is toward the development of general 
explanations. However, like other social science models, game theoretic models do not try to 
address all complexities inherent in social interactions. The value of these models is rather 
derived for developing elegant explanations. For game theory this means narrowing down the 
context of a social interaction. Only the relevant players and moves are evaluated, but 
additional assumptions may be evaluated as the sophistication of the model increases (Gates 
and Humes 1997: 7-8). In this way, it has been worth using a game theoretic analysis to study 
why Norwegian-Russian petroleum relations in the High North have remained cooperative, 
by focusing the analysis on just these two states and limiting the strategic set of outcomes 
available to them in the agreements evaluated. 
 
The game theoretical analysis employed by this thesis has, with this reasoning in mind, 
informed that the bilateral petroleum relationship between Norway and Russia in the High 
North is most similar in nature to the Stag Hunt game. This is because conventional 
representations of Prisoner’s Dilemma games depict neither the realist specification of the 
relative-gains element of the structure of state preferences in mixed-interest situations nor the 
realist identification of the constraining effects of this element on international cooperation 
(Grieco 1988b: 620). This problem specifies that a state will join, leave or limit its 
commitment to any cooperative agreement if it suspects that a partner is achieving, or will 
likely achieve disproportionate gains because of their common venture. The assumption 
inherent in this scenario must therefore be that the two states achieve similar payoffs or 
believe they do so. However, the completely opposite assumption could also be true, as 
players believe both of these outcomes to be highly unequal. Such a view of the PD game by 
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states may be because states do not know, or do not scrutinise, the magnitude of the other 
state’s payoffs or interval ranges (ibid, 603).  
 
According to realism, issues of international politics must remain PD games, but they can 
sometimes be altered so that they are more benign in nature. This can be done by changing the 
payoffs to encourage cooperation, for example by increasing the transparency that allows 
each state to see what the other state is doing and understand why it is doing it (Jervis 1998: 
987). From a realist point of view, a state will be highly dissatisfied if its partner’s payoff 
from a game, or payoff-range, outstrips its own, and this changing of the PD game to liken a 
SH game is therefore necessary to facilitate cooperation (Grieco 1988b: 603). The knowledge 
that even if the other state in the game is benign today, it may become hostile in the future due 
to a change in circumstances, may equally force state officials to create arrangements that 
bind themselves and their partners. In this sense, the binding agreements between Norway and 
Russia in the High North relating to the Barents Sea can be explained by defensive realism. 
Realism, however, cannot explain why deeper forms of cooperation, such as that explored 
between Norway and Russia in the High North, exist between states and this is problematic 
for the explanatory power of realism in this case (Jervis 1998: 987). 
 
Unlike in a PD game, it can be individually rational for two countries to cooperate in a SH 
game. This is as there are two pure strategy Nash equilibria in this game; when both players 
cooperate and when both players defect. Cooperation is therefore not given if the states are 
unsure of one another’s preference orderings. A state that is uncertain about the other player’s 
preferences, should therefore consider the magnitude of the differences between its payoffs. 
The prospects for cooperation also depend on the states' preferences in the game. Cooperation 
should occur if the two states in question believe they are playing a SH game, and there is not 
much of a conflict of interest (Glaser 1995: 81-83). The existence of a Nash equilibrium gives 
a necessary condition for an obvious way to play the game, without prejudging the existence 
of an obvious way to play the game (Kreps 1990: 512-513). The Delimitation Agreement 
reached between Norway and Russia can therefore be considered a Nash equilibrium, or a 
Pareto optimal outcome, as both states reached a settlement by which neither state’s position 
could have been improved without at the same time worsening the position of the other state 




However, this cooperative petroleum relationship between Norway and Russia in the High 
North may also be characterised as cooperative game theory, because of its communication 
aspect, rather than non-cooperative game theory, which is the strand of game theory that has 
been evaluated throughout this thesis. Nonetheless, bilateral relationships have throughout the 
scholarly literature in both political science and economics been characterised by the 
assumptions inherent within non-cooperative game theory. Furthermore, by employing game 
theoretical reasoning to these two hypotheses and the cases outlined above, it is evident that 
Norwegian-Russian petroleum relations in the High North have remained cooperative because 
of both mutual interests in the region and petroleum interdependence. Nonetheless, it is fair to 
say that the petroleum interdependence aspect, in light of the cases and the game theoretical 
analysis employed, is the one that has probably facilitated and pushed cooperation between 
these two states the most. This could also be because this hypothesis is more specific and 
therefore easier to evaluate the impact of than the former.  
 
In the spirit of game theory, it is worth stating that any model advocating human rationality as 
one of its fundamental principles is unrealistic. People are different, and some people are 
better problem-solvers than others. This applies to any setting, even between the individuals 
present at the negotiating table during efforts to settle the boundary dispute in the Barents Sea 
between Norway and Russia. Attempts to model differences human rationality in a 
meaningful way are therefore probably impossible. If it were possible, however, any study of 
political phenomena would be generalising through its underappreciation for differences in 
the human psychology (Helland 2002: 49). 
 
 
7.2 Implications of the main findings  
 
The goal of qualitative analyses is to reach a holistic understanding of specific circumstances 
or to develop theories and hypotheses about particular societal correlations. If the 
circumstances or correlations specified in the research question are more comprehensive than 
those included in the empirical analysis, the research is likely to suffer from generalisation 
(Grønmo 2011: 245). Given this, my conclusions can only be said to apply to Norwegian-
Russian petroleum relations in the High North, and not any other bilateral relationship of 
either a similar or a different nature.  
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The main findings of this analysis may be summarised as follows. Of the two hypotheses 
discussed in this thesis, it is clear that neither of them can single-handedly explain why 
Norwegian-Russian petroleum relations in the High North have remained cooperative. That 
said, there are clearly mutual interests between Norway and Russia in this region, regardless 
of their asymmetries. The two countries share the Barents Sea, they are both interested in 
petroleum exploration and development in these waters, and desire to engage in sustainable 
resource management. Although the degree of cooperation between these two states depend 
heavily on the willingness to cooperate with one another, on both sides, other contextual 
factors also play a significant part. While few expect Russia’s relationship with Norway to be 
of the more troublesome kind, there is still a considerable range within which it can fluctuate 
(Bourmistrov et al. 2015: 20). As a result, this hypothesis is not fully able to explain why 
Norwegian-Russian petroleum relations in the High North have remained cooperative. 
However, if applying Axelrod’s conflict of interest insights, it appears as though the 
cooperative petroleum relationship between Norway and Russia in the High North lies close 
to a position of a minimum conflict of interest, represented by figure 6 (1970: 84). This figure 
demonstrates that the smaller the area to the right of point D, the more compatible the 
objectives of the states in the game are (Axelrod 1967: 92).  
 
Developing offshore Arctic petroleum reserves require a significant amount of resources and 
advanced technology. The latter is something that Russian state-controlled giants Gazprom 
and Rosneft currently lack. Nonetheless, delimitation of the marine space and the seabed in 
the Barents Sea is a step in the right direction for Moscow’s intention to start developing the 
resources under the Arctic seabed. As Kremlin politicians have uttered repeatedly, the 
transformation of the Arctic region into a resource base for the Russian economy is a strategic 
priority for the state. In this respect, Russia’s Arctic Strategy of 2013 is more open than 
previous versions to cooperating internationally to solve some of the key issues faced by 
Russia’s energy sector, namely the lack of technology and practical experience in exploiting 
petroleum fields in the region. In fact, the document plainly states that Russia on its own 
neither has the resources nor the technology to exploit petroleum fields in offshore parts of 
the Arctic (Choi 2014: 70; Zysk and Titley 2015: 320).  
 
Furthermore, it is no secret that both Norway and Russia are attempting to move petroleum 
activities into the Barents Sea. Norwegian developments have been characterized by an 
industry eager to participate, but also wary of adverse commercial conditions. As regards 
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Russian developments, private and foreign interests are kept at bay. Currently, Norwegian 
production takes place in the North Sea for the most part, where oil output is falling. In future, 
production will increasingly be focused on the northern part of the continental shelf, namely 
the Barents Sea. As output from existing gas fields in the south start declining, extending the 
pipeline network northwards is a possible option in order to fill free capacity in North Sea 
pipelines with Barents Sea gas (Moe 2010: 225-226).  
 
The resource pictures in Norway and Russia also differ greatly. While Russia has several 
unexplored areas, Norway’s options are more limited, a fact that has become increasingly 
evident after the year 2000. The Norwegian petroleum industry has strongly advocated for 
increased activity in the North. On the Russian side, however, companies have been more 
hesitant. Although Norway seeks to cooperate with Russia to increase petroleum activity in 
the region, Norway is also a natural gas supplier to the EU, and therefore viewed by Russia as 
a competitor (Baev 2012; Baran 2007). Despite these complexities, both Norwegian and 
Russian regional interests have generally been positive towards development, but regional 
concerns are greater in Norway. In Norway, environmental considerations have worked to 
slow down developments. Contrastingly, environmental constraints have so far not played any 
noticeable role in Russian developments (Moe 2010: 244-247). As a result, this hypothesis is 
not fully able to explain why Norwegian-Russian petroleum relations in the High North have 
remained cooperative, but holds more explanatory power than H1. 
 
If I were to start over with this thesis formulation, there are a number of things I would have 
done differently. Firstly, I would have picked more concise and tangible variables to consider 
in my hypotheses. One option would have been to focus on a regional organ, such as the 
Arctic Council, the Barents Council, or even the European Union, and ask to what extent 
Norway and Russia cooperate on petroleum matters because of either of these institutions 
being in place. Another option would have been to adopt a more legal approach by asking to 
what extent Norway and Russia cooperate on petroleum matters in the High North due to 
UNCLOS (Carlson 2013; Jespersen and Vestergaard 2015).  
 
Secondly, in light of my findings, it could have been more helpful to use a method other than 
game theory. Examples from previous scholarly literature include case study analyses and 
discourse analyses (George and Bennett 2005; Jensen 2010; Kratochvil and Tichy 2013). 
Similarly, my analysis may have benefitted from employing a different IR theory, such as 
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neoliberalism or post-structuralism to attempt to explain the reasons behind the cooperative 
petroleum relationship between Norway and Russia in the High North (Jensen 2012; Jervis 
1999). 
 
However, to defend the path taken during the writing of this thesis, it is worth stating that the 
choices made were thought out and decided upon for several reasons. First and foremost, the 
emphasis on the chosen variables reflect their standing in the wider literature on the topic. 
This is as these variables were mentioned time and again throughout my literature search. Had 
I chosen to focus my research, for instance, on the extent to which a regional organ or a legal 
framework has helped make Norwegian-Russian petroleum relations in the High North 
cooperative, the answer would likely have been inconclusive. This is because measuring 
influence or correlation in qualitative research endeavours is extremely difficult (Gerring 
2012).  
 
Furthermore, the use of game theory in this thesis derived not only from a desire to link this 
method with the topic at hand, but also because several works encountered during the thesis 
formulation used this method for similar political puzzles (Bishop 1963; Brams 1985; Fearon 
1998; Hermansson 1990). Using game theory as my method meant that employing realism as 
the foundation for my IR theory was a good fit (Grieco 1988; Jervis 1988). In this respect, it 
can also be argued that defensive realism fits quite well with the bilateral relationship at hand 
(Jervis 1999: 49). Finally, the use of game theory facilitated a scrutiny of the negotiating 
process between Norway and Russia in the High North based on the agreements selected. 
This is as bargaining situations are often discussed in the wider game theory literature (Banks 
1990; Harsanyi 1956 and 1962; Hovi 1998). 
 
 
7.3 Suggestions for further research  
 
In light of the preceding part of this thesis formulation, it is clear that much remains 
unresolved as to why Norwegian-Russian petroleum relations in the High North have 
remained cooperative. Given that none of the hypotheses evaluated in this thesis can fully 
explain this cooperative relationship, it is worth asking if other factors, that may have been 
more successful in answering the research question, could have been employed.  
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In the literature on this topic, there are a variety of other variables that could have been 
incorporated into this thesis to attempt to explain this bilateral relationship. Scholars have 
previously highlighted the importance of factors such as wider regional cooperation through 
the Arctic Council and the Barents Council, and the fact that very little petroleum exploration 
has presently taken place in the Arctic due to a low oil price and challenging operating 
conditions. Similarly, Norway’s role as an information provider, for instance to the EU, in 
being a bridge to Russia, has effectively granted it a status outside the traditional great 
power/small state hierarchy of international relations. This, in turn, appears to give Norway a 
significant amount of influence in the EU, but also in the AC. This positive and intense 
bilateral relationship grants Norway added authority and a special status in Arctic relations as 
it offers other states an opening to Russian decision-makers (Rowe 2014: 77-78). In light of 
this, it would be worth investigating how Norway’s relationship with the EU affects its 
relationship with Russia in the High North, and how much of a saying the EU has in 
Norway’s dealings with Russia in this region.   
 
Keeping the Arctic Council in mind, it is clear that Russia’s position in the Arctic has been 
aided by the presence of this group of countries and their cooperation. While the Norwegian-
Russian relationship will never be completely independent of the wider Russian-Western 
relationship, it is neither completely reliant on it. If conflicts were to occur, it is likely that 
states other than Norway would be at the forefront of Western disputes with Russia 
(Bourmistrov et al. 2015: 20). In this sense, the AC has helped give Russia a legitimate forum 
where it can communicate with Norway in a constructive manner. As the role of the AC in the 
negotiations discussed above and in wider Arctic matters has not been adequately evaluated in 
this thesis, it requires more scrutiny.  
 
Since Russia saw the 2010 Delimitation Agreement as a way to decrease the influence of 
NATO in the Arctic, this agreement also helped Russia reduce the urgency of one of its main 
perceived threats to its security. Thus, although Norway is an important ally in the Arctic, 
Russia also views Norway as a NATO member part of a broader Western military alliance. 
This dualism makes Norway both more threatening and a potentially more useful partner 
(Orttung and Wenger 2016: 88). It could therefore be worth researching this dualism further 
and asking how this plays into the relationship between Norway and Russia in the High North 
more widely. Similarly, Norway being a NATO member may also serve to make the 
petroleum relationship between Norway and Russia in the High North more problematic, but 
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this line of reasoning is far from certain. Thus, it would also be worth researching how being 
a NATO member affects Norway’s relationship with Russia, particularly regarding matters 
pertaining to the High North.   
 
Some scholars have also pinpointed that focusing on the petroleum industry is a step 
backwards. Instead, it has been suggested that Norwegian-Russian petroleum cooperation in 
the High North today is rather the result of wanting to develop more environmentally friendly 
solutions to explore and extract petroleum resources in this region. That being said, the High 
North has not been this high on Norway’s foreign policy agenda since the Cold War. It can be 
argued that this is due to the opportunities and challenges of the area as a future petroleum 
province. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, feeble attempts were made to bring about 
various Norwegian-Soviet cooperation projects in the petroleum sector. However, it soon 
became apparent that developing oil fields in the Barents Sea was further down the agenda in 
Moscow than was the case in Oslo, although Soviet exploration in this area had produced 
several interesting finds (Gottemoeller and Tamnes 2008: 76; Holtsmark 2015: 582-3). 
Nonetheless, while the oil price fell dramatically mid-2014, it has recently recovered, and this 
helps put research questions on petroleum matters in the High North back into the spotlight.  
 
Finally, cooperation in repeated games may be due to properties of the game itself, such as 
differences in payoffs and the prospect of continuation. However, the likelihood of 
cooperation may also be affected by circumstances that occur outside of the game. The 
literature on repeated games has previously investigated the effect of differences in personal 
characteristics, but this has reaped no robust correlation with behavior in games. The effect of 
personal characteristics in determining the outcome of repeated games therefore demands 
more attention. The process by which players learn to play Nash equilibrium is neither fully 
understood and requires further scrutiny. Similarly, the effect of history; the experiences 
players had before entering the repeated game in question, should be considered more closely 
as these may serve to alter the outcome of the game. Researching the effect of history on 
Russia, for instance, would make an interesting addition to the scholarly literature on 
petroleum relations in the High North and what makes them cooperative (Bó and Fréchette 






7.4 Concluding remarks  
 
Bó and Fréchette explain that choices made in infinitely repeated games likely are not 
independent of one another. Therefore, this lack of independence can help support 
cooperation over time, as states condition their future behavior on past events (ibid, 78). As 
such, states learn to play the game as they go along. In light of these considerations, given the 
hypotheses discussed and the agreements presented, it is evident that Norwegian-Russian 
petroleum relations in the High North are very much in the pipeline. They may progress for 
some time, then stagnate suddenly, and then flourish again later.  
 
In this sense, their cooperative petroleum relationship in the High North, with reference to the 
agreements discussed in this thesis, can be viewed as a strategy of tit-for-tat. This is because 
they both play cooperatively as long as the other state does, but any defection on either part 
will trigger a period of punishment, in which the other state will not cooperate (Dixit, Skeath, 
and Reiley 2015: 381; Jervis 1988: 339).  
 
What is clear, nonetheless, is that both Norway and Russia are determined to cooperate in 
order to push petroleum developments in the High North, now and in the future. Much is still 
unknown about the relationship between these two states and what makes them want to 
cooperate on petroleum matters in this region. What is probable, however, is that mutual 
interests and petroleum interdependence are important factors pushing these two states to act 
cooperatively on petroleum matters in the High North. Nevertheless, these factors cannot, 

















Aasen, Pål Jakob. (2010). “The Law of Maritime Delimitation and the Russian-Norwegian 
Maritime Boundary Dispute”, FNI, Report 1/2010. 
Alagic, Ajla. (2009). “Russia and Norway in the High North: Petroleum, Security and the        
Room of Manoeuvre”, UiO, Master’s thesis.  
Anderson, A. (2009). “The Great Melt: The Coming Transformation of the Arctic”, World 
Policy Journal, 26 (4): 53-64.  
Angell, Elisabeth, Eikeland, Sveinung and Selle, Per. (2010). Nordområdepolitikken sett fra 
nord, Fagbokforlaget.  
Attali, Jacques. (1972). Analyse économique de la vie politique. Presses Universitaires de 
France.  
Austvik, Ole Gunnar. (2007). “The Geopolitics of Barents Sea Oil and Gas: The Mouse and 
the Bear”, International Association for Energy Economics, Third Quarter: 19-23. 
Axelrod, Robert. (1967). “Conflict of Interest: An Axiomatic Approach”, The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, 11 (1): 87-99.  
Axelrod, Robert. (1970). Conflict of Interest: A Theory of Divergent Goals with Applications 
to Politics. Markham Publishing Company: Chicago.  
Axelrod, Robert. (2006). The Evolution of Cooperation, Basic Books.  
Baev, Pavel K. (2012). ”From European to Eurasian energy security: Russia needs an energy 
Perestroika”, Journal of Eurasian Studies, 3: 177-184.  
Baev, Pavel K. (2017). “Russia’s Arctic Dreams”, Reconnecting Asia. Big Questions. 
Accessed on 22/01/2018.  
Baldwin, David A. (1971). “The Costs of Power”, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 15 (2): 
145-155.  
Banks, Jeffrey S. (1990). “Equilibrium Behavior in Crisis Bargaining Games”, American 
Journal of Political Science, 34 (3): 599-614.  
Baran, Zeyno. (2007). “EU Energy Security: Time to End Russian Leverage”, The 
Washington Quarterly, 30 (4): 131-144.  
Bartenstein, Kristin. (2009). “Flag-planting. What legal framework governs the division of the 
Arctic continental shelf?” International Journal, 65 (1): 187-206.  
Binmore, Ken. (1991). Fun and Games: A Text on Game Theory. D. C. Heath and Company.  
Binmore, Ken. (2007). Game Theory: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press. 
Bishop, Robert L. (1963). “Game-Theoretic Analyses of Bargaining”, The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 77 (4): 559-602.  
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Timeline of Events 
 
Date Event 
1957 The Varangerfjord Agreement is ratified 
1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea  
1969 First commercial oil discovery made on the Norwegian continental shelf 
1973-74 OPEC I 
1976  Norway and the Soviet Union announce the extension of their economic zones  
1978 The Grey Zone Agreement is ratified 
The Soviet Union starts comprehensive seismic surveying in the Barents Sea 
1979-80 OPEC II 
1980  First production licenses north of the 62th degree awarded 
1982 UNCLOS established 
1986 OPEC III 
1987 Gorbachev gives Murmansk speech calling for an ‘Arctic peace zone’ 
1988 Discovery of the Shtokman gas field 
1989 Prirazlomnoye oil field drilled 
1990-91 Breakup of the Soviet Union 
1992 Establishment of the Barents Secretariat  
1996 Establishment of the Arctic Council 
2006 Fusion between Statoil and Hydro announced 
Norwegian ‘Government’s strategy for the High North’ announced 
2007 Russia plants a flag on the North Pole seabed 
Production of the Snøhvit field starts 
2008 Russian ‘National Security Strategy’ for the Arctic announced 
USGS release appraisal of undiscovered Arctic oil and gas resources 
Ilulissat Declaration announced 
2009 Follow-up Norwegian document ‘New building blocks in the north’ released 
Russia releases its ‘Energy strategy of Russia for the period up to 2030’ 
2010 The Delimitation Agreement is ratified 
2012 The Shtokman field is declared unprofitable for the foreseeable future 
2013 Russian follow-up document on its Arctic Strategy released 
2014 Russian annexation of Crimea and subsequent war in eastern Ukraine 
First cargo of oil from ice-covered waters loaded from Prirazlomnoye field 
2015 Russian State Commission on the Development of the Arctic established 
 
